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The general framework for liberalization and regulation of public 
utilities in countries of ex-Yugoslavia
aThis edition of Network Industries Quarterly aims to provide insights into the general legal fra-
mework for liberalization and regulation of public utilities, notably communal services, in countries 
of ex-Yugoslavia. Among ex-Yugoslav countries, two are European Union (EU) Member States 
(Slovenia and Croatia), two are in the process of accession negotiations (Montenegro, Serbia), one 
is a candidate country (Macedonia) and one represents a potential candidate country (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina).
After World War II, ex-Yugoslavia was a unique example of self-management, and a specific system 
of governance and societal ownership of companies, including public utilities. In the early 1990s, 
Yugoslav disintegration and democratization coincided with economic transformation from a socia-
list market economy to a market economy. However, legacies of the past economic system are still 
present in some aspects, albeit in some countries more than others, and influence the process of 
liberalization of public utilities. This process was urged by joining the EU or is still urged by EU 
accession requirements. Most of the impetus for liberalization comes as a response to low invest-
ments in infrastructure, as most of these countries have reached high debt levels and therefore a 
private finance infrastructure seems to be a solution. The market liberalization agenda began to come 
to the front, and regulatory reform urged creation of independent regulatory agencies for state-wide 
public utilities such as electricity and gas markets. On the other side, municipal (communal) services 
are mainly provided by local authorities and public operators. Liberalization agenda in many of 
these countries presupposes privatization of public undertakings, contracting out or alternatives to 
privatization such as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and concessions, with special attention given 
to the general legal framework for PPPs and concessions in these countries. 
The following are some of the issues the country contributions have strived to address:
• The scope and characteristics of public undertakings providing utilities and the character of public 
utilities owned or regulated by local self-government units;
• PPPs and concessions as an “alternative” to full privatization: basic overview of active projects and 
reference to the legal and institutional framework for PPPs and concessions;
• Liberalization agenda and the main issues in regulating local public utilities (communal services);
• The character of regulatory powers and challenges posed to municipalities in regulating communal 
services.
Although all country contributions have a similar structure, the level of detail may differ, notably 
due to the existing level of development of the normative and institutional framework in a respective 
country and different experiences in private sector involvement. After presenting the institutional 
and normative setting, in the concluding remarks authors have identified the main pitfalls and pros-
pects for change. Although differences exist, it seems that the volatile political situation in many 
countries of ex-Yugoslavia and the fragile political will to perform necessary reforms of public (inclu-
ding local) administration and public sector of the economy are the most important deficiencies.
Therefore, it is necessary to adjust legal and regulatory frameworks and create a stable economic 
environment. Local administration and business communities have to understand the concept of 
PPPs and private finance initiatives, while policymakers and local authorities must develop adequate 
plans and facilitatory structures for potential PPP projects, including capacities to initiate projects 
and perform cost-benefit analysis for the potential projects.
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General remarks
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a complex country 
whose legal nature provokes different views (federa-
tion, confederation, etc.). It consists of two entities, the 
Republic of Srpska (RS, 49% of the country) and the 
Federation of BiH (FBiH, 51% of the territory of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina), with Brcko District as condominium 
of both entities. Also, the FBiH is further divided into ten 
cantons. Each of these territorial units (entities, District 
and cantons) has its own legislation and constitutes a sepa-
rate legal subsystem within BiH. The whole of the public 
sector is finally complemented by local government units 
(cities and municipalities) and public enterprises.
BiH, like other candidate countries for membership of 
the European Union (EU), has the obligation to create a 
three-year program of economic reforms1. End of January 
2016, the Program of Economic Reforms (ERP BiH 
2016-2018) has been adopted at the state level. In addi-
tion to the macroeconomic data, it contains the overall 
program of structural reforms to improve the growth and 
competitiveness of the country. BiH as a country of about 
3.8 million inhabitants had a GDP in 2015 of about 29 
billion BAM. Total public spending is about 41% of GDP 
(of which external debt is about 29%)2, while the unem-
ployment rate is between 27-28%.
Like the territorial organization of BiH, the legislation 
relating to the issue of utilities and public-private par-
tnership (PPPs) is also dispersed. RS, Brcko District and 
each of the cantons of the FBiH have their own laws on 
public utilities and PPP, which are at different levels of 
alignment with the EU acquis communautaire. Thus, in 
the FBiH only Zenica-Doboj Canton has harmonized 
its Law on PPP3 with the European standards. Although 
there are initiatives, the FBiH has not yet passed its law, 
but the Program of economic reforms of FBiH for the 
period 2016-2018 anticipated its adoption. Also, the law 
does not exist at the level of the overall state. However, at 
the state level, there are other laws related to the matter 
of PPP, for which provisions apply in the process of esta-
blishing partnerships, such as the Public Procurement Act4 
and Concessions Act5, which also exist at other levels of 
legislative power.
The scope of utilities services provision and local go-
vernment jurisdiction
Utility services as activities of general interest in BiH fall 
within the jurisdiction of local governments6, which are 
regulated by the constitutions of the entities (eg., art. 5 
of the Constitution of RS), and on the basis of them, the 
laws on local government7. Only Brcko District, which 
operates as a unit of local government, is stated in the 
Constitution of BiH (art. 6/4). Independent competences 
of the local government units, inter alia, in the area of 
services include planning and providing performance of 
utility services: the production and supply of water, gas, 
thermal energy, public transport of people in urban and 
suburban transport, the purification and wastewater dis-
posal, the funeral activities, maintenance, arrangement 
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dossier
The author analyzes the state regulation of utilities and public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and points to the different models 
of implementation of the PPP, as well as practical experiences. The conclusion is that there is a need for harmonization of regulation and the reinforce-
ment of the role of supervisory authority.
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and equipping of public green and recreational areas, 
maintenance of public traffic routes in settlements, storm 
and other water drainage from public areas, cleaning of 
public areas in settlements and other utility services, in 
accordance with the laws on local government8. Namely, 
the assembly of the local government may also determine 
other utilities as activities of special public interest, if they 
are indispensable for life and work of citizens, companies 
or other organizations. Similar enumeration of municipal 
activities is contained in the Communal Activities Act of 
RS9 under art. 2, with some added activities such as waste 
disposal from residential and business premises, mana-
gement of public spaces for car parking, maintenance of 
public toilets, management of cable ducts for communi-
cation cables and systems, marketplace activities, chimney 
sweep business, public lighting in urban areas and activi-
ties related to animal hygiene. The Communal Activities 
Act of Canton Sarajevo10,  in turn, adds activities of deco-
ration and maintenance of public clocks. Those activities 
can be divided into activities of individual or collective 
utility consumption, depending on whether it is possible 
to charge them separately from each user according to the 
amount of actually performed utilities.
For the above enumerated purposes, public companies 
in ownership of cities and municipalities (also they can 
be founded at the level of several local governments) can 
be founded or the conduct of activities contracted out to 
the private business entities on the basis of PPPs, with 
retention of the right to secure the organization and the 
manner of their performance, as well as supervision. The 
Local Government Act of RS under art. 39 (2) gives expli-
cit competence to the assembly of the local government 
to affirm the price of utilities. This is confirmed by the 
Communal activities Act of RS in art. 20 (3), but is also 
emphasized in art. 6. that local government can make a 
decision to prescribe in detail the possibility for the sub-
sidized price of utilities, categories of beneficiaries and 
terms of subsidies, and in general the unit of calculation 
for each type of public utility and the payment method 
of utility services. In any case, if the public enterprise is 
not given the approval for the price of the utility service 
and thus the provision of customer service to customer 
would be brought into question, the local governments 
can compensate the difference between existing and eco-
nomic price of utilities from their budgets. Unlike the RS 
legislation, laws in the FBiH do not define that the level 
of utility service price is determined by the service provi-
der, but merely give it the right of making the proposal. 
Thus, Communal Activities Act of Canton Sarajevo in art. 
22 (5) stipulates that the validity of the utility provider’s 
calculations and final proposal for the price of utility is de-
termined by the independent expert body of the Canton, 
city or municipality, and the actual price is determined by 
the Government of the Canton or city/ municipal council. 
This means that public authority has even power to change 
the price proposed by the provider of utility service, and 
not only to give consent.
It should be noted that for the certain services of general 
economic interest, the criteria for determining the price 
may be additionally defined by lex specialis which regu-
lates those activities, such as, for example, the distribu-
tion of electricity11. In this area, prices may depend on the 
status of the customer. In fact, the customers who meet 
the requirements for obtaining the status of an eligible 
customer, and have the right to purchase electricity from 
the supplier by their choice, can negotiate the price with 
the seller. Such status have, eg., "Birač" Zvornik in RS, or 
"Aluminium" Mostar in the FBiH (Baltić, 2016). The spe-
cifics are also present in regulation relating to the activity 
of water supply (Zulić, 2015).
Regarding the activities of the joint utility consumption, 
the determination of utility charges is specifically affected 
with the level of equipment of settlements with the com-
munal facilities and devices of joint utility consumption, 
as well as with the quality and standards of communal pro-
ducts and services. Determination of the amount of utility 
charge is, in any case, under the jurisdiction of the public 
sector body and it is a joint common solution in the laws 
on communal activities in BiH.
The legal nature of public utility companies
Public utility companies which local government units are 
establishing for the purpose of performing utility activities 
are, by their legal nature, public companies and, provided 
that their organizational structure is not regulated by the 
laws on communal activities, the provisions of the laws 
on public enterprises are applied. The basic characteristics 
of public companies are that they perform activities of 
general interest and that their major shareholder is an en-
tity from the public sector. Thus, according to the Public 
Enterprises Act of the RS, public company is considered a 
legal entity established in a form of joint stock company or 
a limited liability company to perform activities of general 
interest and in which basic (share) capital RS or some local 
government have a majority stake, either directly or indi-
rectly12. The organizational structure of these companies, 
however, differs from the general regime of the Companies 
Act RS13, so the obliged bodies are stakeholders meeting, 
dossier
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8 See art. 18 (2) of the Local Government Act of RS.
9 Official gazette of RS, No. 124/11.
10 Official gazette of Canton Sarajevo, No. 14/16. See art. 3. of the stated Act.
11 In addition to the law at the state level, there are laws at the entities level which establish regulators in which jurisdiction is determination of prices.
12 See art. 2 (1) of the stated Act, Official gazette of RS, No. 75/04 and 78/11.
13 Official gazette of RS, No. 127/08, 100/11 and 67/13.
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the supervisory board (which the Companies Act RS does 
not recognize), and management (comprising the director 
and executive directors). In addition to these bodies, in the 
context of the implementation of internal procedures the 
audit committee is also included (Rajčević, 2012). Thus, 
unlike the general regime which is based on the one-tier 
system of corporate governance in the domain of public 
enterprises legislator still stands on the positions of the 
two-tier system, which once represented the basic solution 
for all companies (according to the Law on Enterprises RS 
of 1998, which is no longer in force).
In carrying out their activities the public enterprises are 
subject to the risk of decreased efficiency due to the absence 
of competition, as well as corruption, which is particularly 
manifested through circumvention of procedures provided 
by the Public Procurement Act (Avramovic, 2010). Even 
these reasons indicate the need for transformation, as well 
as harmonization of the legal system with the EU acquis 
communautaire, particularly in the area of PPP, as well as 
competition law.
Many utility companies are privatized in accordance with 
the privatization laws enacted on the territory of BiH. 
Thus, the Privatization of State Capital Act of RS14 has 
enabled the privatization of the part of the basic capital in 
the former purely state owned public enterprises. In some 
of them private subjects took over the majority share, while 
the entity (RS) has retained a majority stake only in com-
panies that have been declared companies of strategic im-
portance. The classic example of communal activity which 
is now in a 100% private property is "Marketplace"15  ltd 
Banja Luka. This company has originally been partially 
privatized and after that in 2011 a company "MG Mind" 
from Mrkonjic Grad took over a majority stake. By 2013 
“MG Mind” reached 90% of the share capital and bene-
fited from the possibility of squeezing out the remaining 
shareholders. Finally, “Marketplace” is transformed into a 
limited liability company16. In addition, the "MG Mind", 
through its subsidiary company "Marketplace" indirectly 
took over a controlling stake in another former public 
utility company, which now operates under the name 
"Cleanliness"17 municipal service a.d. (joint stock com-
pany) Banja Luka and is engaged in activities of street 
cleaning, removal of home, street and industrial waste, 
snow cleaning, and the like18. Accordingly, this company 
is, at present, regulated by the Companies Act, and not the 
Public Enterprises Act.
There are, however, opposite examples. One of them is 
the city of Tuzla which has won the annulment of the 
Decision of the Privatization Agency of Tuzla Canton of 
2001. After 14 years the city council in Tuzla unanimously 
adopted the decision on the protection of public utilities 
and the need to be declared public good19. Thus, privati-
zation of five utility companies: Public Utility Company 
(PUC) "Water supply and sewage", PUC "Komunalac”, 
PUC "Commemorative Center", "Market-marketplace" 
and "Central heating", was prevented.
Public-private partnership 
Local governments are often not able to independently 
solve problems within their scope, including utility ser-
vices, as well as the activities of public services (Dukić 
Mijatović and Golic, 2013), so the PPPs may represent a 
solution. The decision to initiate the procedure for esta-
blishing PPPs is brought by assemblies of the concerned 
local government units, while the agreement on mutual 
rights, obligations and responsibilities of public partners in 
the process of establishing a PPP, is concluded by mayors 
or heads of the concerned local government units, on the 
basis of prior consent given by assemblies20. The role of 
the public partner may, however, play other public sector 
entities, such as the state, entities and cantons (or their 
governments through relevant ministries), public institu-
tions and public companies21.  
In any case, public partners should draft tender documen-
tation before announcement of public invitation. They 
should also prepare a study of economic feasibility prior 
to the private partner selection procedure and apply com-
petitive dialogue in stated selection process. Therefore, it is 
of great importance to educate participants in procedures 
of preparation and implementation of PPP projects. The 
commissions for the PPP in FBiH and District, as well as 
commissions for concessions, on the state, entities, canto-
nal and district level have the role to organize specialized 
programs of education of public partners and other par-
ticipants. Other competent bodies22 can cooperate with 
stated commissions. 
   Supervision
The realization of PPPs involves finding a compromise 
between the two interests. On the one hand, the interest 
lies in achieving social welfare and quality of life by im-
dossier
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18 “Marketplace” thus has about 51% of the share capital in “Cleanliness”, while City of Banja Luka participates with only 30%. See the ownership structure 
at: https://www.blberza.com/Pages/issuerdata.aspx ?code=cist
19 www.ekapija.com/website/bih/company/photo Article.php?id=684732&path=dozvole_160511.jpg
20 But there are various solutions in the legislation. Thus, for example, under art. 18. of the PPP Act of RS, Official gazette of RS, No. 59/09 and 63/11, 
when local government unit or public institution/enterprise founded by the local government unit is a public partner, the consent should be given by the 
Ministry of finance and the competent ministry, while in other cases the Government of RS gives consent on conclusion of contract.
21 See determination of public partner under art. 6 (1) of the PPP Act of RS, Official gazette of RS.
22 In the case if there is any.
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proving the level and quality of services of public interest, 
and on the other hand, in realizing the economic benefit 
of its own activity (Cvetković, 2015; Cvetković, 2014). 
Therefore, the question of supervision over the imple-
mentation of such projects is of great importance. In RS 
the control is performed by the relevant ministries, the 
Ministry of Finance, the relevant inspection bodies and 
the Supreme Service of the Public Sector Audit23. The le-
gislative bodies of the FBiH24 and Brcko District25  provide 
the commissions for PPP (founded by the Government 
of the FBiH Canton or the District), which also have the 
right to monitor the implementation of PPP projects, but 
without any special power. They only examine the reports 
and information on implementation of the PPP projects 
and then inform the governments (of canton or district) 
on their findings.
Also, the services of local government are authorized to su-
pervize PPP projects implemented at the local level. In RS, 
this jurisdiction is stipulated by the Communal Activities 
Act under art. 32-33, which stipulates that control over 
the implementation of regulation in the field of utility ac-
tivities, is performed by the body of the local government 
responsible for utilities. Administrative control is perfor-
med by the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Construction 
and Environment, while the communal police of the local 
government unit, as well as other inspections when needed 
represent inspection authorities. Finally, the regulations 
governing consumer protection entrust public authorities 
with the possibility to protect users of public utilities’ ser-
vices which are provided through the PPP, given that it is a 
service of general economic interest as defined in indicated 
regulations26. 
  Contractual forms
Two basic forms of exercizing PPP in BiH are contractual 
and institutional form. 
As stated, the Public-Private Partnership Act of Zenica-
Doboj Canton regulates only contractual forms of par-
tnerships, and the two models: 
a) basic - where the legal basis is the right of construc-
tion and by which the payment of compensation to the 
private partner is made entirely or mainly from the bud-
get based on the availability of public service according 
to agreed standards, 
b) special - where the legal basis is concession and by 
which the payment of compensation to the private 
partner, entirely or mainly, is done by the end users of 
public service. 
Art. 6 of this Act emphasizes that the private partner un-
dertakes the obligation from the public partner and the 
risks associated with financing and construction process, 
and at least one of the two key risks: the risk of availabi-
lity of public building or demand risk. The procedure for 
concluding a contract consists of the identification phase 
of a PPP project, the PPP project proposal preparation, 
selection of the private partner and contracting PPP. The 
public partner submits the final text of the contract for the 
opinion of the competent Attorney. The Act also contains 
provisions on anti-corruption27. On the other hand, the 
Public-Private Partnership Act of RS opens the possibility 
that the public partner may propose other types of contrac-
tual form of public-private partnerships28. It also empha-
sizes in art. 6 (5), as well as the Public-Private Partnership 
Act of Canton Sarajevo in art. 9, that the private partner 
may, for the purposes of conclusion, i.e., contract enfor-
cement, establish a company with special purpose. This 
company is involved exclusively in the implementation of 
the PPP project, which is the reason why it was founded.
Accordingly, the contractual PPPs can be established on 
the basis of one of the two procedures regulated by special 
laws, and those are public procurement procedure, regula-
ted by the Public Procurement Act of BiH, or concession 
procedure, regulated by the Concessions Act of BiH, and 
separate entities and cantonal laws. Thus, the Concessions 
Act of BiH provides for the Commission for Concessions 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to act as an independent re-
gulatory body, which carries out its competence in the 
capacity of the Commission for Concessions BiH or in 
the capacity of the Joint Concession Commission, which 
performs functions and powers in relation to the grant of 
concessions which are not exclusively BiH jurisdiction or 
in the case of issues that arise in connection with the grant 
of concessions between BiH and / or RS. The entities, in 
turn, have their own commissions for concessions29. 
The concession is granted to a bidder who responded to 
the invitation to tender, who has fulfilled all the criteria 
set out in the tender, and who has high ranking in relation 
to other tenderers, i.e. the one who is declared as the most 
successful. To attract as many quality bidders, the invita-
tions to tender are sent to a large number of addressees 
and, if the Commission for concessions BiH requested 
so, it will be sent an international invitation. There is a 
possibility that a potential bidder sends a self initiated 
offer to competent Ministry, which then estimates whe-
dossier
Network Industries Quarterly 9 | o 1  | 7 6
23 Art. 24, the PPP Act of RS.
24 See, eg., art. 23 of the PPP Act, Official gazette of Canton Sarajevo, No. 27/11.
25 See art. 5 of the PPP Act of Brcko District BiH, Official gazette of Brcko District, No. 2/10.
26 Thus at the level of BiH is passed the Consumer Protection Act, Official gazette of BiH, No. 25/06, as well as the Act of the same name at the level of RS, 
Official gazette of RS, No. 6/12 and 63/14.
27 Art. 30 of the PPP Act of ZDC.
28 Art. 10 (3) of the stated Act.
29 Art. 5-6 of the stated Act.
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ther there is a public interest and, in the case of a positive 
attitude and after the authorization from the Commission 
for Concessions of BiH has been obtained, initiates ne-
gotiations with the bidder for the grant of concession30. 
Concluded concession contract assumes also certain status 
effects compared to the concessionaire in the sense that 
he cannot transfer, directly or indirectly, more than 15% 
of voting rights, unless he receives the approval of the 
Commission. Also, he cannot perform any activity other 
than that specified in the concession contract.
Concessions Act of RS32 stipulates under art. 7 the pos-
sibility of carrying out concession on the Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) model, and allows contracting other 
models for the implementation of concession. Concession 
agreements are concluded for a period not longer than 
50 years, but can be renewed. Supervision over the im-
plementation of this Act is performed by the competent 
authorities of administration of the RS and inspection is 
carried out by the Department of Inspection Affairs and 
competent inspections of local government units.
    Institutional form
Unlike the Public-Private Partnership Act of the Zenica-
Doboj Canton, other laws on PPP in BiH regulate the 
institutional form of PPP, which is based on co-ownership 
between a public and private partner in a joint company 
responsible for the implementation of PPP project. The 
founding of such a business organization is preceded by 
the conclusion of the contract of partnership, as an un-
named contract of civil law (in current legislation). This, 
in fact, represents a phase of foundation of the company 
which is subject to the general company law regime.
   Implementation in practice
It should be noted that in BiH there are examples of 
implementation of PPP projects. According to its value, 
in particular, project proposals from the health sector are 
most successful. As the best example can be mentioned 
the inclusion of the private health institution “Euromedic 
International” from the Netherlands during the formation 
of Dialysis Center at the Clinical Center in Banja Luka. 
That company has been selected on the basis of the tender 
announced by the Government of the RS in 2000. Besides 
the center in Banja Luka, this company has built a modern 
center for chemo dialysis in Bijeljina, Laktasi and East 
Sarajevo, too, by which it provides patients the European 
standard of services. In cooperation with the Dutch com-
pany, which is also one of the largest operators of health 
institutions through PPP, the Centre for radiotherapy wit-
hin the Clinical Center of Banja Luka is also equipped, 
as one of the most modern in the region. “Euromedic 
International” has invested in the purchase of equipment, 
and the Health Insurance Fund reimburses radiation the-
rapy to all its insured persons. According to data from the 
study on economic viability, the Fund should in this way 
achieve cost savings of at least 6.5% (Vukovic 2014). Apart 
from the already completed projects, the other project 
proposals in the health field are also made and waiting for 
implementation, such as the construction and equipping 
of the Center for Cardiosurgery in a spa village Slatina in 
the municipality of Laktaši (Komasar, 2015).
In addition to the health sector, PPP projects have been 
successfully implemented in other areas, such as transport 
(in this sector it is just waiting for the realization of a signi-
ficant project proposal relating to the construction of the 
highway Doboj-Vukosavlje as a part of the Corridor Vc 
which passes through RS), parking, street lighting, public 
garage, as well as tourism and culture. Such is the project of 
construction of "Kamengrad- Andric's town" in Visegrad, 
according to the preliminary solution of the celebrated 
film director Emir Kusturica. For the realization of this 
project a joint company "Andrićgrad" has been founded, 
co-owned by a Emir Kusturica’s company "Lotika", the 
Government of the RS and the municipality of Višegrad. 
The “Lotika” has a majority share of 51% (Vladušić 2012). 
The town has constructed city hall, theater, museum, li-
brary, memorial house of Ivo Andric, and other objects. 
The project is worth about 15 million EUR.
Conclusions
Legislation of PPP in BiH is fairly dispersed and positio-
ned at different levels of alignment with the EU acquis. 
In this sense, there is a need for harmonization, where of 
great benefit could be the planned adoption of the law on 
PPP at the level of the FBiH entity.
The need to improve the quality of public services is, in 
any case, beyond doubt, and the lack of public funds fur-
ther emphasizes the importance of developing cooperation 
between public and private sector.
PPPs, on the other hand, carry risks, especially with re-
gards to applying the competition law and the possibility 
of creating corruptive conduct. Therefore, the competent 
supervisory authorities should have an enhanced role. 
Non-punishment of illegal actions causes mistrust towards 
these forms of investment, which ultimately harm the 
country's economic development. The regulations alone 
must clearly emphasize the need to protect the public inte-
rest in the conduct and control of implementation of PPP 
projects.
Finally, the public sector must do more to attract investors. 
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It is necessary to pay more attention to the creation of the 
strategy of developing PPP, especially at the local level. The 
positive results also come with the realization of a large 
number of projects of lesser value, not just the big ones.
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Background
When one makes a survey at the public sector in Croatia 
and compares it to the IMF’s Governments Finance 
Statistics Manual (2014), an obvious conclusion follows: 
Croatia’s public sector encompasses more than 60% of the 
GDP. Namely, public owned enterprises revenues alone 
make roughly 28% of all revenues of the business sector in 
Croatia (Vizek, 2015). The central government revenues 
were around 40% of the GDP in 2016, and those of the 
local government were around 7% of the GDP. The public 
debt is around 85% of GDP at the end of 2016 and the 
persons employed in the public sector represent 23% of 
the total employed persons. However, if persons employed 
by publicly owned enterprises were to be included, this 
percentage would be significantly higher (44%)32. 
The public sector comprises of: central government, 
local government, all public entities which are financed 
through the central budget (public healthcare system, pu-
blic education system) and Non-financial corporate sec-
tor (HEP Group, Croatia Airlines, Adriatic Oil Line etc.) 
and Financial corporate sector (Croatian National Bank, 
Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Croatian Postal Bank) whose obligations are included into 
the public debt. It should be noted that local self-govern-
ment  is extremely fragmented, with 576 units of local 
and regional self-government: 428 municipalities, 127 
cities, 20 counties (regional level of local self-government) 
and the capital – City of Zagreb33. This must of course be 
compared with the number of inhabitants of roughly 4 
million34. 
As a general remark, it can be said that the size of the go-
vernment regarding its share in Croatia’s GDP is too large 
and that from that a conclusion must be derived – that the 
central state is the most important factor in the economic 
developments and growth in Croatia. The local govern-
ment makes around 7% of the GDP which is comparable 
with other South East European (SEE) countries (NALAS, 
2016), which also shows a lack of decentralization and 
from that a conclusion must be derived that Croatia is a 
highly centralized state. The system of local and regional 
self-government is fragmented and not equipped to fulfill 
its role to the public.
Public Utilities in Croatia
In Croatia’s legal setup of public utilities, which is pres-
cribed by the Local and Regional Self-government Act35 
and the Utility Services Act36, providing public utilities 
(with the exception of electricity which is the obligation 
of state owned HEP Group) is the obligation of the units 
of local self-government – municipalities and cities. Public 
utilities include water supply, water drainage and purifi-
cation, public transportation, waste disposal, public areas 
maintenance, maintenance of non-public roads (local 
roads, streets, squares) and public lighting. In order to pro-
vide public utilities, municipalities and cities have several 
options regarding the way in which these services will be 
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provided. They can set up a company, public institution 
or its own service without legal subjectivity. Furthermore, 
they can give a concession or sign a special contract for 
providing public utilities (except for water supply, water 
drainage and purification, for which the Waters Act37 pres-
cribes they must be provided by a company exclusively 
owned by the local municipality or city with the exception 
of water drainage and purification which can be provided 
via concession also). Providing electricity is the obligation 
of the state-owned company – the HEP group. 
The regulatory powers regarding public utilities are va-
riously prescribed in different special laws regulating dif-
ferent areas. For example, if a municipality or a city chose 
to give a concession for providing waste disposal, they are 
responsible to monitor the concessionaire according to 
the Concessions Act38, but this is also the responsibility 
of the Ministry of finance because of the fact that conces-
sion incomes are partly the income of the central budget. 
Municipalities also regulate the prices for waste disposal 
according to the Sustainable Waste Management Act39, 
give their approval to the prices for water services as is 
prescribed by the Waters Act, etc. It is safe to say that local 
self-government has a vital role in providing and regula-
ting public utilities no matter the way they are provided. 
The government also has an important role in establishing 
prices for some utilities. For example, the price for electric 
energy is determined by using the Methodology for deter-
mining prices for calculation of electric energy40 which is 
passed by the Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency. This 
Agency is also responsible for a similar Methodology for 
the prices of gas and the prices of heat energy. Additionally, 
the Government of the Republic of Croatia has the autho-
rity, under the Gas Market Act41 to determine the highest 
price of natural gas for households for a period of maxi-
mum three years.
According to some authors (Primorac, 2010), there are 
167 companies which provide public utilities in Croatia, 
and are set up as publicly owned companies. Other sources 
state that there are around 152 public companies which 
provide water supply. It is safe to say that there are several 
hundred entities which provide public utilities in Croatia. 
This is a result of the fragmented system of local self-go-
vernment which hinders the development of public ser-
vices due to the inability of many municipalities to pro-
vide basic public services.
Liberalization agenda
There is strong opposition to the liberalization of public 
utilities, especially regarding water supply. Privatization 
of certain public utilities is regarded as a highly volatile 
political question. In 2016 Croatia passed the National 
reform plan42. It does not mention privatization with the 
exception of companies in which the state has a minority 
stake, only the improved management of public compa-
nies is highlighted. In general, public opinion regarding 
concessions, PPP and privatization in the sector of public 
utilities is fairly negative, which has political consequences 
as the ruling elite, regardless of their political background, 
hesitates to broaden private investments and influence in 
this sector.
Public Private Partnerships
PPP is regulated by Public-Private Partnership Act43. 
Under this Act, PPP represents a long-term contractual re-
lationship between public and private partners focused on 
building and/or reconstructing public buildings in order 
to provide public services. The private partner, through 
the duration of the PPP, takes on the risk regarding the 
building process and minimally one of the following risks: 
the risk of availability of a public building or the risk of 
demand. There are two models of PPP: contractual PPP in 
which public partner signs a contract with a special com-
pany and status PPP which is based on a joint company 
which implements the PPP project. The PPP contract 
must be signed for duration of minimum three years, and 
maximum 40 years. The public partner has the right to 
establish the standard for services provided, payment and/
or collection of established fee and to supervise the provi-
ded services. The private partner has the right to manage 
the risks taken and the right to charge the service, or to 
pay the fee. If a public authority plans to enter into PPP, 
it has to notify the Agency for investments and competiti-
veness (Agency) regarding its intention. There is a public 
authority body in Croatia whose function (among others) 
is to help public authorities to prepare PPP projects – the 
Center for Monitoring Business Activities in the Energy 
sector and Investments. This public body has been appoin-
ted as implementing body for the government PPP pro-
gram and PPP projects. It is charged with helping public 
bodies in preparing PPP and in conducting all phases in 
PPP projects.
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38 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 143/12.
39 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 94/13.
40 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 71/16.
41 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 28/13, 14/14.
42 Nacionalni plan reformi 2016 [National reform plan 2016], http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/nrp2016_croatia_hr.pdf
43 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 78/12, 152/14.
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The Agency either refuses or accepts, with the consent of 
the Ministry of Finance, the proposed PPP project. If the 
Agency refuses the project, its decision may be challenged 
in front of the competent administrative court. The selec-
tion of the private partner is then regulated by the Public 
Procurement Act44, and the only applicable criteria for se-
lection is the economically best tender. The Agency keeps 
records on all PPP, controls their implementation through 
the duration of the PPP, and approves any changes in the 
PPP contract. The public partner has a responsibility to 
send reports to the Agency every six months regarding the 
implementation of the PPP. When implementing PPP, it 
is possible to grant a concession to the private partner. 
Of course, PPP is possible through concessions. without 
a special PPP contract, especially through concessions for 
services and concessions for works. In these concessions 
the concessionaire provides the service or implements the 
works and is granted the right to collect fees for his services 
and/or to manage the built facilities.
The concessions system is governed by the general 
Concession Act, but also by many special laws which dif-
fer more or less from the Concessions Act. The concession 
procedure is rather lengthy, with the obligation to publi-
cly announce the tender, pass the concession decision in 
a form of an administrative act, in order to subsequently 
sign the concession contract which is an administrative 
contract. The decision is subject to appeal to the body 
which resolves appeals in the public procurement proce-
dures, and the contract is, for now, subject to revision un-
der the regular courts, but with the entering into force of 
the new Concessions Act in 2017 it will fall under the ju-
risdiction of administrative courts. It should be noted that 
the Concessions Act which is now in force (from 2012) 
is not fully aligned with the acquis (Directive 2014/23/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on the award of concession contracts45), 
but that will change with the forthcoming Concessions 
Act.
It is also important to mention the Strategic Investment 
Projects of the Republic of Croatia Act46 under which a 
project, if it is characterized as a strategic one, is imple-
mented faster and with less bureaucratic red tape. The 
Government formed a Committee for strategic investment 
projects which selects and approves such projects, whose 
president is the vice-president of the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia. Once granted this status, all proce-
dures in connection with such a project are considered to 
be urgent. This is also one of the steps the government 
took in order to improve investments and the overall in-
vestments climate in Croatia. 
PPP practice in Croatia
There were examples of PPP in Croatia in the past, espe-
cially in road constructing, with the example of BINA 
Istria which was granted a concession to build highways 
in Istria in 1995. But, the development of PPP in Croatia 
started in earnest in 2007 with the construction of sports 
halls in the form of PPP in which the private partner built 
the halls (in Varaždin and Split), and the public partner is 
paying the lease until the contract expires and the halls be-
come the property of the public partners. Other examples 
of PPP in Croatia are reconstructions of public buildings 
(schools, terminals, administrative buildings). The most 
important PPP is the construction of the new Zagreb 
Airport which is a PPP in a form of a concession with a 
value of 1,420,800,000 HRK (approximately 190 million 
EUR). The value of PPP which are in the PPP register 
with the Agency is 2,538,434,056 HRK (approximately 
340 million EUR).
Project name Capital worth (HRK)
Zagreb Airport 1,420,800,000
Sports hall Varaždin 177,174,280
School upgrade Varaždin group 1 27,628,610
School upgrade Varaždin group 5 39,685,001
School upgrade Varaždin group 4 13,939,404
School upgrade Varaždin group 3 16,065,311
School upgrade Varaždin group 1 and 2 31,932,259
School upgrade Varaždin group 3 and 4 40,560,479
School upgrade Varaždin group 2 18,427,258
School upgrade Varaždin group 1 49,677,685
Reconstruction of Varaždin’s County 
building
8,976,983
Bus station Osijek 120,000,000
Koprivnica highschool 69,566,786
Arena Split 504,000,000
Total 2,538,434,056 (without 
VAT)
Table 1 – contracted PPP in Croatia47 (1 Euro=7.6 HRK)
There are many projects in the planning phase with the 
Center worth 2,111,047,976 HRK (approximately 277 
million EUR) which have been approved by the Agency 
with a pending public procurement procedure in order to 
select the private partner48.
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44  Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 120/16.
45  Official Journal of the European Union, L 94/1, 28. 3. 2014.
46  Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 133/13, 152/14, 22/16.
47  http://www.aik-invest.hr/jpp/projekti/
48 http://cei.hr/upload/2015/10/20151021_dynamic_562788a163399.png
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Project name Capital worth (HRK)
Justice square Zagreb 1,350,000,000
Neuropsychiatric hospital Popovača 124,500,000
General hospital Varaždin 240,000,000
Home for the elderly Gerovo 24,000,000
Varaždin County schools 107,000
Istria County & town of Poreč schools (4 
schools)
145,759,900
Town of Koprivnica schools (3 schools) 100,000,000
Rebuilding of public lightning city of 
Kraljevica
4,160,000
Rebuilding public lighting city of Novska 7,000,000
Rebuilding public lighting municipality of 
Višnjan
1,520,000
Rebuilding of public lightning city of Novi 
Vinodolski
4,194,298
Rebuilding public lighting municipality of 
Kostrena
1,875,874
Total 2,111,047,976 (without 
VAT)
Table 2 – approved but not yet contracted PPP in Croatia49 (1 Euro=7,6 
HRK)
Conclusion 
PPP is not unknown in Croatia, and has a rather long 
history of use. However, a lot of PPP projects were not 
completed, or, if completed, became a source of financial 
problems for the public partners (especially for municipa-
lities which realized that they cannot afford the cost of the 
projects). Today PPP is reserved for smaller projects than 
before, as can be seen from the data supra regarding the 
contracted PPP and the projects that are pending comple-
tion. There are also problems regarding the aforementio-
ned fear of privatization of public utilities, especially water 
services which has created a somewhat hostile environment 
for investments, especially foreign. The government tried 
to put up a PPP in which highways would be given into 
concession to private partners, but was stopped by huge 
public dissent. Most privatization processes are hindered 
by a lack of political support, which can also be seen from 
the data given supra regarding the huge economic impact 
of the state in Croatia’s BDP. Furthermore, the political 
situation has been volatile in the last year and a half, which 
is also hindering public administration reforms and of the 
system of local self-government. This reform is of crucial 
importance in order to better the public utilities system, 
as it depends on the capacity of the local self-government. 
To conclude, there are many ways in which investments 
through PPP and concessions can be bettered, but that all 
depends on the (non) existence of political will to perform 
necessary reforms.  
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Background
The public sector in Macedonia as per the IMF’s Global 
Financial Stability indicator (GFS - IMF 2014) defini-
tion incorporates: central government; local government; 
non-financial corporation sector (Electricity Generation 
Company, AD ELEM and Electricity Transmission 
Company, AD MEPSO) and financial corporation sec-
tor (Macedonian Bank for Development Promotion). 
The central government revenues are around 31% of the 
GDP in 2015 and the local government revenues are 
around 5.4% of the GDP in 2015. The public debt is 
around 50.6% of GDP in Q3 2016 and the employed 
persons in the public sector represent 23.4% of the total 
employed persons in Q3 201650.
Some general observations from the public sector data in 
Macedonia are that the central government and funds in 
Macedonia are around 30% of the GDP thus; the size of 
the government measured with this indicator is relatively 
low compared to other transition countries and compared 
to the OECD countries (Nikolov, 2009a). Further, local 
government in Macedonia is a bit more than 5% of the 
GDP and this is comparable with the other South East 
Europe (SEE) countries but it is lower than the developed 
countries in EU (NALAS, 2016; Nikolov, 2013). Note 
also that the finances of the Public Utility Companies 
(PUC) owned by the local governments in Macedonia 
are not consolidated with the presented data.
Public Utilities in Macedonia
Macedonian municipalities inherited experience in ma-
naging the communal competencies from the Former 
Yugoslavia. Since independence and the start of transition 
in 1991 power has traditionally been centralized and the 
only competencies municipalities have had were in the 
area of communal services until 2005 even though the law 
on local self government was enacted in 2002 the proper 
local government finances came to be defined and regu-
lated with the law on financing local self government in 
2004 (UNDP, 2005). 
In accordance with article 22 of the Law on local self go-
vernment municipalities have competencies in communal 
activities in: water supply, waste water sewage, public li-
ghting, public cleaning, rain water drainage, public trans-
portation, gas and heat supply, cemeteries management, 
local roads reconstruction and construction, public par-
king, green markets management, green areas and parks, 
and solid waste management.  
All the conditions related to the communal activities like 
financing, design, construction, maintenance and related 
are regulated in the Law on communal activities from 
2012 and other proper by laws like the law on public 
enterprises. In accordance with the Law on communal 
activities the providers of communal services are the PUC 
established by the municipalities and the City of Skopje 
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census is around 2 million.
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and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.  
PUC at the local government level are established by the 
municipal councils. The PUC by the Law on communal 
services are licensed communal service providers. On the 
other hand, as per the Law on public enterprises the mana-
gement of the PUC are the Board of Directors with the 
Director General and the Supervisory Board. The Board 
of the Directors comprises at least 5 and at most 15 mem-
bers and their mandate cannot be longer than 4 years. The 
Director of the PUC is appointed and can be fired by the 
Mayor of the municipality. The Supervisory Board is com-
prised of 5 members appointed by the municipal council. 
The mandate of the Supervisory Board members is 4 years 
as per the law on public enterprises.
As already noted, the finances of the PUC in Macedonia 
are not consolidated with the municipal public finances. 
Macedonia has one-tier local government with 80 munici-
palities and the City of Skopje as a separate local govern-
ment unit comprising 10 municipalities. The councils of 
these municipalities established 69 PUC in Macedonia. 
The municipal councils also approve the PUC annual 
accounts and tariff changes and also guarantee any long-
term loans. The recent reform was the setting of tariffs 
for water services by the central regulatory body. The 
regulatory competencies are organized in a way of exten-
ding the competencies of the existing Regulatory Energy 
Commission with the competency of regulating the tariffs 
of the water services (regulated in the proper energy law51). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Macedonia 
   Investment needs
The investment needs in Macedonia both at central and 
local level government were already confirmed not only by 
the World Bank PER documents from 2008 and domes-
tic researchers (Nikolov, 2009b) but with citizens’ lesser 
satisfaction with the quality of public services and regio-
nal misbalances (UNDP, 2009; Bartlett et al, 2010). The 
needs for investment are relatively high in contrast to the 
relatively low fiscal space at the central and local govern-
ment budgets and low domestic and foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI) in Macedonia (CEA 2016). The donors are 
downsizing their engagement in Macedonia, the capacity 
to utilize the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) is weak 
(Nikolov, 2016) and it seems that the PPP can be the ins-
trument to settle the often contradictory goals among the 
government, investors and consumers. 
In Macedonia, as per the last Public Investment Program 
dossier
(PIP) 2009-2011 the total cost of the planned projects 
is estimated at some 2.5 billion EUR (Nikolov, 2011). 
Estimated capital investment needs in the area of waste 
water for example in Macedonia can go up to 250 EUR 
per capita on average (Becchis, 2015). Estimated invest-
ment needs for approximation to EU environmental legis-
lation in the sectors of urban waste, sewerage, municipal 
waste management (landfill and other installations) are 
around 430 million EUR (CEA, 2006). It is also men-
tioned in the PIP that the government’s imperative is to 
engage foreign investments primarily through concessions, 
donations, PPP, direct and joint ventures. On the other 
hand, to be consistent with the period of the PIP, the Fiscal 
strategy for the period 2011-2013 mentions the PPP in 
the context of the local governments: “...a proper effect is 
expected from the initiative of the private sector in the pu-
blic sector through the PPP as incentive to improvement 
of the local service quality and increase of the revenues”. 
Macedonia is a candidate country for integration into 
the EU and it has to comply with the EU’s standards 
and rules, in particular with the EU Directives on Public 
Procurement (PP) including PPP and concessions and ful-
fill the benchmarks for Chapter 5 of accession negotiations 
relating to PP. The PPP model attracts investments into 
public infrastructure and services worldwide. However, it 
continues to remain occasional rather than systematic in 
Macedonia (ReSPA, 2015). 
   Compliance of PPP and concession with the EU acquis
In Macedonia, PP law and PPP law are aligned in general 
with the EU acquis. The authority responsible for moni-
toring and control of PP law is the Ministry of Finance 
and the authority responsible for monitoring and control 
of PPP law is the Ministry of Economy. Related to the 
procurement, there is a by-law adopted by the Public 
Procurement Bureau (PPB) where the criterion for the 
most economically advantageous tender is prescribed52 as a 
contract award criterion. However, the recent frequent use 
of the lowest price as a criterion for awarding a public pro-
curement contract (including PPP/concession contract) 
violates the principle of value for money (VFM). 
Types of PPP contracts as per the Macedonian PPP 
legislation
Depending on the means of remuneration by the public 
partner for the provided public works and/or public ser-
vices, as well as allocation of key inherent risks, a public 
private partnership in Macedonia can be established, as 
per the PPP law, either as: public works concession and/
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or contract or public service concession and/or contract. 
Public works and services concession according to the in-
ternational terminology are a concession contract, Build–
Operate–Transfer (BOT) or Design-Build-Finance-
Operate-Transfer (DFBOT) projects i.e. user pay projects. 
Public works and services contracts according to the 
international terminology are work contracts and service 
contracts i.e. authority-pay projects.
   Example of PPP in municipalities in Macedonia
In Macedonia at central government level the most signifi-
cant concession so far was the airport project. At the local 
government level, a number of public utility contracts 
have been signed in the following areas: waste manage-
ment, zone system of public parking, public lighting and 
administrative offices buildings. We illustrate examples of 
PPP projects for various sectors where the sector falls un-
der the competency of local government (Nikolov, 2015):
Waste disposal: City of Skopje as a grantor awarded a 
concession agreement covering the reconstruction of the 
landfill "Drisla” – Skopje, including construction of new 
installations for the disposal of waste in accordance with 
EU standards and within the investment dynamics given 
in the bid of the selected concessionaire. The concession is 
implemented as an institutional PPP, given that existing 
public enterprise established by the City of Skopje is trans-
formed into a Limited Liability Company whose founders 
are the City of Skopje (20% equity) and the foreign private 
partner as majority partner (80% equity). City of Skopje 
is obliged to guarantee a certain amount of waste each 
year. In the case of less amount of waste, City of Skopje 
is obliged to compensate the unrealized income from the 
waste disposal to the concessionaire. The investment was 
estimated at about 90 million EUR and by the contract is 
expected for the private investor to invest 73 million EUR 
of capital. The period of the contract is 35 years.
Street lighting: The Municipality of Makedonski Brod 
has awarded a concession contract for public service - 
reconstruction, modernization and maintenance of pu-
blic lighting - in the municipality of Makedonski Brod 
for a period of 10 years with an estimated value of some 
270,000 EUR. The private partner is obliged to replace 
existing light bulbs with new energy-saving light bulbs and 
to maintain them for the period of the contract but also to 
extend the scope of the service with new lightning spots. 
The remuneration of the private partner pays the munici-
pality from the funds it collects from the citizens and legal 
entities on behalf of the communal tax. Given that ener-
gy-saving bulbs provide electricity savings after electricity 
company payments and payments to the concessionaire, 
the municipality should generate some income and assets 
will remain to the municipality after the expiration of the 
dossier
concession period. 
Parking: Municipality of Bitola as grantor has awarded a 
public service concession - zone system of parking. The 
concessionaire is obliged to acquire the spider vehicle, 
management software system parking zone, PD devices 
for zone system of parking, foxes, vertical and horizontal 
signaling, "call centre" and other equipment needed for 
the operation of parking lots, as well as to do winter and 
summer parking-marking. In return for the investment, 
recovering the costs of operation and achieving reasonable 
profit, the concessionaire is entitled to charge end-users for 
parking services. The concessionaire pays the municipality 
a concession fee each year. The investment is estimated 
at about 261,000EUR. The number of parking places is 
1,679. The period of the contract is 6 years. The public par-
tner-Bitola is responsible for construction of the parking 
places. Most of the parking lots were already constructed 
and the smaller amount that needed to be constructed 
should be constructed by the Bitola municipality.  
Administrative offices building: The Municipality of 
Gjorce Petrov has awarded a public works contract for the 
construction of a municipal administrative offices building 
(municipal hall) with approximately 3,500 square meters. 
Private partner is obliged to design, finance, construct 
and transfer the municipal hall. The private partner on 
the other side was awarded the right to build a commer-
cial building with approximately 11,500 square meters in 
its ownership on the land which is owned by the public 
partner. Private partner got a 40% discount on the land 
construction fee. Implementation of this contract is in 
process. 
Conclusion
The need for modern infrastructure and better services 
is evident in Macedonia. The lack of proper fiscal space 
both at central and local level budgets makes the PPP an 
opportunity to meet citizens’ needs for better services and 
to achieve value for taxpayers’ money.  
Macedonian PPP legislation is generally compatible but 
not fully compliant with the acquis. The specific PPP/
concession law exists where a clear definition of PPP/
concession are prescribed together with criteria for PPP 
project approval. On the other side the PPP/concession 
regulations do not provide criteria for fiscal impact of 
PPPs assessment and the PPP/concession regulations are 
not compliant with the EU (Eurostat) rules on govern-
ment deficit and debt. 
There is a lack of political will and champions to make 
the environment for PPP in Macedonia more transparent. 
Prevalent practice is that PPP has been seen in Macedonia 
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as a “pocket bank’ where the public sector can take mo-
ney from the private partner so that the public sector can 
continue to work as usual and more, stigmatizing the pri-
vate partner if searching for profit. 
Proper central and local government level coordination is 
missing. The decentralization in Macedonia is more of a 
deconcentration than devolution type (Nikolov, 2013). 
For example, if a municipality wants to go for a PPP for 
a kindergarten, the municipality can use block transfers 
from the central government for child protection for its 
best use. Risk arises because if the public partner pledges 
the block transfer to the private partner in order to achieve 
value for money the private partner cannot employ people 
in the new kindergarten as it must wait for ministerial 
approval to fund new employees. Additionally, if the kin-
dergarten is privately run there is a risk for fiscal oversight 
when budgeting for the next fiscal year. The quasi devo-
lution of the fiscal decentralization makes it risky and/
or practically impossible to exercise PPP at local level for 
“decentralized” competencies such as education and child 
care in Macedonia. 
"Lack of proper needs assessment at central and local level 
for infrastructure projects in order to make pre-feasibility 
PPP assessment as of what project are affordable and what 
projects provide good value for money so that it can be 
considered as PPP projects. For example, at the municipal 
level the author is not aware of any proper strategic plans 
of municipalities in direction of identification of what 
projects can be considered as PPP projects."
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Introduction
According to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
Database as of October 2016, Montenegro, population 
0.622 million, recorded a GDP of EUR 2.601 billion 
(2014). GDP for 2017 was projected to be EUR 2.922 
billion.
Montenegro’s public sector consists of the Government 
of Montenegro, appointed in December 2016, with 19 
ministries, 19 bodies/agencies belonging to relevant mi-
nistries, 6 separated administrations, 2 secretariats, 7 ins-
titutes, 1 directorate and 1 agency. Montenegrin territory 
is divided into 21 municipalities, Capital of Podgorica 
with 2 City Districts and The Old Royal Capital of 
Cetinje. Namely, there are 23 local self-governments in 
Montenegro, while 2 of them are recently established 
with poorly developed administration53.  
Local budgets are financed from: (i) own income – taxes 
or fees determined by local parliaments, but limited by 
general legislation; (ii) legally shared revenues, inclu-
ding Personal Income Tax, Concession Fees, etc.; (iii) 
Equalization Fund and (iv) national budget.
The public sector should provide the highest possible 
level of services for local populations. Therefore, it should 
invest resources provided by populations and national 
resources in infrastructural projects. Provision of sources 
is always a challenge for the public sector since regular 
budget incomes and resources’ utilization are limited by 
their own capacities and economic-political decisions. 
Challenges that national, especially local governments in 
Montenegro are facing are related to keeping the fiscal 
self-sustainability and poor potential to provide signifi-
cant investment from the public incomes in infrastructu-
ral projects. Additional characteristics of national and local 
budgets are previous and inherited/chronically high debt 
and high dependence on external financing: donations, 
foreign investments, and loans from international finan-
cial institutions. 
Public Utility Services
According to the Law on Local Self-Governments and 
other relevant administrative regulations in Montenegro, 
public utility services in Montenegro are assigned to lo-
cal self-governments. Each of the local self-governments 
in Montenegro, according to the local regulations, has 
an established local public utility company/companies 
for providing public utility services: water supply, sewage 
and draining systems, solid waste removal and recycling, 
public lighting, parking services, etc. Additionally, local 
self-governments have established local departments to 
deal with conducting and developing communal services, 
maintaining communal facilities and securing communal 
order. They also engage in construction and reconstruc-
tion works on local and uncategorized roads, streets and 
passages in settlements. They arrange for construction 
and use of facilities, outbuildings and temporary facili-
ties, adequate development in accordance with local urban 
planning and communal services. Therefore, local self-go-
vernments in Montenegro are mostly interested in making 
public utility service more efficient and effective.
Companies that local self-governments had established 
in Montenegro were Public (Utility) Companies (PUCs) 
prior to implementation of the Law on Improving 
Business Environment, effective in 2010. The law brought 
local governing bodies into public competency. Therefore, 
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all local PUCs became companies – rarely shareholdings, 
mostly Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) founded 
100% by local government. The major positive effect of 
this transformation, forced by the law, is that those com-
panies could be privatized, transformed, and managed 
by professionals, either partly or temporarily. On paper 
those companies are a part of the free market! Although 
all PUCs became LLCs within 3 years as prescribed by the 
law, almost nothing changed in their business operations, 
development, financing or management. 
  Box 1: 
The Law on Local Self-Governments and the Law 
on Public Utility Services calls on local governments 
to organize public utility services. Local Parliaments 
establish Public Utility Companies (PUCs) with 
100% ownership, management and control. Local 
Parliaments also determine and control prices and ser-
vice quality on a regular basis through annual reports 
delivered by those Companies. Pricing methodology 
and monitoring of the complete public utility sector is 
entrusted to the Government of Montenegro. There is 
no case of sharing ownership, management or control 
over PUC’s in Montenegro, although that option is 
possible, having in mind that PUC’s are organized as 
LLCs. Examples of providing public utility services by 
some investors or another company are arranged as 
separate projects or time-limited contracts. 
The new Law on Public Utility Services, effective 
February 2018, prescribes that the Energy Regulatory 
Agency will be in charge of licensing companies that 
could provide public utility services, determines price 
methodology, monitors quality of services provided, 
takes care of public interests and proposes regulations 
in the area of public utility services. 
PPP legal framework in Montenegro
Local public utility companies are facing poor financial 
and other capacities to provide quality services and local 
governments have recognized PPP as an adequate and 
efficient model for accommodating all interests. However, 
Montenegrin legislation does not recognize PPP and the 
Draft Law on PPP dates February 2015. Considering the 
EU Directives and best practice in this area, this is highly 
recommended, but still in the “public debate phase”. The 
Draft Law aims to determine conditions, ways and pro-
cedures for adopting PPP projects, rights and obligations 
of both public and private partners, content and proce-
dure of PPP contracts, PPP forms, best bidder selection 
procedure and other relevant issues. The draft is based on 
the following principles: public interest protection; public 
dossier
government free management; transparency; non-discri-
mination; equal treatment (prohibition of discrimination 
of any person); indivisibility of the project; proportionali-
ty; free competition; efficiency; environmental principles; 
legal security; free will. 
Current legislation for this issue in Montenegro is related 
to the Law on Private Sector Participation in Delivery of 
Public Services and Law on Concessions. Some parts of the 
Law on Private Sector Participation in Delivery of Public 
Services were put out of force after adopting the Law on 
Concession. The Law on Private Sector Participation in 
Delivery of Public Services aims to increase the level of 
private sector participation in activities of common/public 
interest. It is applicable to all public bodies and refers to 
delivery of public services relevant for the contract on lea-
sing and management, as well as agreements on BOT. The 
Law on Concessions is substantially transposed into the 
Draft Law on PPP, while now it determines the conditions 
and procedures of utilizing public resources by a private 
company for the common/public interest. 
Still, new Draft Law on PPP is criticized in various aspects: 
it reduces the control role of the National Parliament in 
comparison to the Law on Concessions, as the Government 
of Montenegro is to decide and monitor concession 
contracts; it excludes the public debate on each concession 
contract, which is mandatory; there is no time limitation 
for the concession contracts as it is currently foreseen in 
the Law on Concession (60 years); it foresees the esta-
blishment of the Agency on Investments as the monito-
ring body, responsible to the Government of Montenegro, 
which again excludes the National Parliament from deci-
ding on utilization of national resources. Additionally, the 
Law on Concessions defines several types of concession 
contracts although only public works and public services 
concessions could be considered as PPP projects.
According to the Law on Concessions, local govern-
ments are attributed a certain share of a concession fee 
if the concession subject is located on its territory. That 
share is regulated by the Law on Financing Local Self-
Governments in the following way: 70% of the concession 
fee for natural resources, 20% for the port and 20% for 
the coast use. Although municipalities participate in the 
concession contracting procedures, the government is ma-
king decisions on the choice of concessionaires and deter-
mines other contract elements. The budgets and transfer 
of concession fees transfer between national and local level 
is not quite transparent.
Despite this and the fact that municipalities and Union 
of Municipalities54 as their supporting institution analysed 
and recognized the PPP model as efficient and adequate 
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for providing quality services at low costs, they do not 
have plans for utilization of facilities and locations for PPP 
implementation, they still have not developed adequate 
analysis and expertise in this area, nor the expert support 
at the national level.  
Although best practice examples are available, including 
the South East Europe PPP Network which does not 
include Montenegro, Montenegrin authorities have not 
scrutinized best practices despite obvious need, especially 
at the local level. 
PPP practice in Montenegro
Available data on completed or implementing PPP pro-
jects in Montenegro could not be fully given as exact and 
final since there are no systematic data neither at the natio-
nal nor local level. The Concession Commission is keeping 
records on the concession contracts, which include PPP 
projects, but without clear difference between PPPs by its 
definition and other types of concessions. National and 
local governments implemented several PPP projects:
National level:
• In the IT sector, the Government of Montenegro 
acquired the “Wireless Montenegro Project” in 2011. 
This project includes the supply and operation of a 
digital radio communication system for the national 
emergency services and a Wi-Fi broadband internet 
network for commercial use. It was developed as an 
institutionalized (joint venture) PPP in which the 
government has a 25% stake and the Austrian private 
partner has the remaining 75%. The system has par-
tially been implemented whilst the Wi-Fi broadband 
internet network still has to be deployed.
• The Ministry of the Economy procured 13 conces-
sions for the construction and operation of small hy-
dro-power plants under two bundled tender processes 
conducted in 2008 and 2010. Four of these were ter-
minated early due to the non-fulfilment of contrac-
tual obligations by the private partners, while others 
are under some of the implementation phases.
• The Ministry of Education implemented a students’ 
dormitory project in Podgorica in 2012. In this pro-
ject, the private partner is responsible for the design, 
financing, construction and operation of a student 
accommodation facility, which will be transferred to 
the Ministry once the 30-year contract has expired.
• The Ministry of Health procured two concessions: 
25-year contract for the financing, construction and 
operation of a PET/CT equipment, signed in 2010 
dossier
and 15-year contract for the financing, construction 
and operation of a medical waste facility, signed in 
2011.
• Several projects in the tourism sector through conces-
sion and/or leasing attractive coastal zones for its valo-
risation were planned in 2010 and some of them are 
currently in the implementation phase (Lustica Bay), 
others are in the tendering phase (Ada Bojana, Velika 
plaza) that the Ministry of Sustainable Development 
and Tourism is working to coordinate the projects.
Local level:
• The Capital of Podgorica recently (end of 2016) 
announced signing the PPP contract with a local 
construction company on reconstruction of the city 
stadium. The agreement is to share business premises 
at the stadium after the reconstruction 66.4%: 34.5% 
in favour of private partner. 
• The Capital of Podgorica implemented two urban de-
velopment projects (commercial centres and market 
halls) and a social housing project. 
• The local government of Cetinje implemented a small 
street lighting project under a 25-year contract for the 
commercial and touristic development of the “Lipska 
Cave” speleological site.
• The local government of Herceg Novi implemented a 
local road project under a 22-year concession.  
• The local government of Budva is implementing 
several touristic PPP projects: resorts, golf courses, 
hotels. Some of them are postponed, while some are 
in progress. 
Conclusion
PPP concept has not been introduced and implemented in 
Montenegro as it should have been. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to adopt and adjust legal, regulatory and political fra-
meworks, create a stable political-economic environment, 
harmonize laws with EU’s regulations and best practices. 
Local business communities and policy stakeholders are 
unfamiliar with the PPP concept. They should have easy 
access to the information. It is important to present the 
concept to those who decide and those who might benefit 
from.
Montenegrin institutions at the national and local level 
are still not part of regional and other networks in this 
area. Some institution should be established for making 
this concept available and familiar to relevant bodies.
Network Industries Quarterly | vol. 19 | o 1 | 2017 1
Network Industries newsletter  | vol. 13 | n°3 | 2014        20 
Even those PPP/Concession projects implemented or 
planned in Montenegro are not targeting the sectors they 
are intended for – public utility services. There is no ade-
quate plan or structure for potential PPP projects that 
include the investment need assessment, spatial and other 
plans for particular location, cost-benefit analysis for the 
potential projects, organizational proposal and other key 
elements for initiating PPP project. Loans are still the 
main source of financing infrastructural projects, which 
makes Montenegro even more financially instable. 
One of the strongest advantages of the PPP concept is its 
transparency and it’s unclear as to whether this is a cause or 
consequence of the situation for its lack of implementation 
in Montenegro despite the necessity for such measures.
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1. Introduction
The Republic of Slovenia55 became an independent 
country on 25 June 1991. Simultaneously, it began to 
transform its political and economic systems and sub-sys-
tems. Not surprisingly, the Slovenian public sector also 
underwent this process.
The initial impetus for public sector transformation can 
be mostly attributed to internal factors. A new constitu-
tional order brought many substantial organizational and 
procedural changes, which directly or indirectly affected 
the Slovenian public sector and triggered its transfor-
mation56.  Further impetus came from outside due to 
increased participation in the international community. 
The most important factor however was the country’s 
orientation towards the then European Community 
(EC)57.  Its influence has been present even before the 
Republic of Slovenia became a Member State in 2004 
and a member of the Euro-zone in 2007. Obligations 
accepted during the association process and even more so 
after accession play(ed) a significant role in shaping the 
Slovenian public sector or at least of its ‘economic part’58, 
which traditionally includes public utilities.
Before I proceed to discuss public utilities in the Republic 
of Slovenia, I would explain some related concepts, na-
mely, public sector, public undertakings and public ser-
vices. Public sector of the Republic of Slovenia is consisted 
of: public organs or administration at the state and local 
level, public funds, public institutes, (independent) agen-
cies established by the state or/and by one or more muni-
cipalities, Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia (manda-
tory service), Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of 
Slovenia (mandatory service), public economic institutes, 
and public undertakings and other legal persons under 
the state or/and municipalities control. Public underta-
king has two meanings in the Slovenian legislation. The 
Services of General Economic Interest Act defines public 
undertaking by using narrow formalistic approach, since 
it is defined as a company established and governed by 
the state or/and one or more municipalities for the pro-
vision of services of general economic interest. On the 
other hand, the Transparency of Financial Relations and 
Maintenance of Separate Accounts for Different Activities 
Act defines it by using wide functional approach (as used 
in the Directive 2006/111/ES). Public services in the 
Republic of Slovenian are non-economic or economic 
activities subject to public services obligations. Here, the 
General Framework for Liberalization and Regulation of 
Public Utilities – the Case of the Republic of Slovenia
Aleš Ferčić*
* Dr. Aleš Ferčič is an associate professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Maribor and Head of the Institute for Public Law at the University of 
Maribor. He holds the following courses: Constitutional and Administrative Law and European Union Legal System: Selected Topics; Administrative Law; 
and European Economic Law. His specialty is Public Economic Law. ales.fercic@um.si 
55 The Republic of Slovenia is a parliamentary republic. Its public administration is organized at the state and local level. The local public administration 
is composed of 212 municipalities whose typical competences are local spatial planning and development, and provision of local public services including 
water and wastewater service). Some state’s macroeconomic data: GDP(2015): 18,693 EUR per capita; volume growth of GDP (2015): 2.2 %; GDP per 
capita in PPS[EU-28 = 100](2015): 83; actual individual consumption per capita in PPS[EU-28 = 100](2015): 75; public debt (2015): 83.1 % of GDP; 
share of domestic production in total supply of goods and services (2013): 69.7 % (total value of domestic production: goods 33.2 %, services 66.8 %); 
average price change for total use(2013): 96.4 %; average price change for final household consumption(2013): 100.4 % (see: the Slovenian Statistical 
Office web-page).
56 Without any ambition to discuss new constitutional order and the aforementioned significant changes in this article, let me just point out a shift from the 
administrative economy to the social market economy.
57  And after the Lisbon Treaty from its ‘successor’, i.e. the European Union.
58  Because of the principle of institutional autonomy this influence was more or less indirect.
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main emphasis is on the economic public services, which 
correspond to services of general economic interest in the 
sense of article 106(2) of the Treaty on Functioning of the 
European Union.
Liberalization in the network infrastructure sectors
Liberalization in network infrastructure sectors, such as 
energy, communications, postal services and transport sec-
tors, has been unrolled according to the European Union 
(EU) legal framework59 consisting of sector specific rules 
(and of general competition rules)60. Yet this in spite of 
the sector specific approach, used because of considerable 
differences between the aforementioned sectors61, one can 
perceive more or less the same pattern of liberalization 
process in those sectors. 
First, legal barriers for market-entry, (mainly) created by 
exclusive and special rights, were removed62.  But this 
alone would not suffice for the transformation of pre-
viously closed and uncompetitive markets to (more) com-
petitive markets, since companies that would like to enter 
this market, i.e. new-comers, would not be able to effec-
tively offer services because of the lack of (own) network 
infrastructure, having a characteristics of essential facility, 
which was in hands of ex-monopolists, i.e. incumbents. 
Therefore, the second logical step was a pro-competitive 
regulation, through which actual and not merely formal 
dossier
conditions for the establishing of desired market compe-
tition intended to be created. By this kind of ex-ante eco-
nomic regulation precisely the problem of infrastructure 
should be solved, which is characterised by a combination 
of a natural monopoly and economic irreversibility of 
(fixed) costs. This was done in such a way that the obli-
gation of the incumbent, which owned the infrastruc-
ture, was defined such that it had to provide interested 
companies with access to it, and at an appropriate price. 
Moreover, this price was/is not set by the incumbent, but 
by the so-called national sector regulator63, which was esta-
blished as an independent regulatory agency specifically in 
order to define price and to perform other ex ante regula-
tion in certain64 economic sectors under the liberalization 
process. Since the simultaneous presence of the former 
vertically-integrated monopolist on the markets, both 
above and below the network infrastructure operation 
market proved to be problematic in a daily practice65, this 
eventually led to its disintegration or by using different 
kinds of separation66 of the network operation from other 
business activities.
As a result, in the aforementioned sectors competition gra-
dually sprang up but not of the same kind and not of the 
same intensity. Namely, in the central or pure public uti-
lities markets, i.e. network infrastructure operation mar-
kets, one can mainly find competition for the market67, 
while in the upstream and downstream markets dominates 
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59 Considering the nature of this article, I do not discuss the European Union legal framework in detail here; however, for practical reasons I would like to 
point out the following:
- the European Union law has a constitutional character within the Slovenian legal system;
- the European Union has an exclusive competence in the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market;
- the so-called sector specific rules define far-reaching obligations for Member States, however, this is not to say, that all-sectors general competition or econo-
mic rules do not play any role but rather opposite;
- the European Commission shall ensure, inter alia, the application of competition rules and shall, where appropriate, address appropriate directives or deci-
sions to Member States.
60  Considering the European Commission’s practice in last ten years, it is obvious that the general competition rules, such as articles 101, 102 and 107 TFEU, 
are often used for the purpose of (full) liberalization.
61 One size simply does not fit all.
62  Such a ‘de-monopolization’ is a pro-competitive deregulation. Since a deregulation can be oriented towards more or less competition; I use the adjective 
'pro-competition'.
63 In the Republic of Slovenia there are more than just one sector regulator. 
64 Such as energy sector (around 3 % of GDP2015), communications sector (around 4 % of GDP2015), postal services sector (around 0.5 % of GDP2011) 
and transport sector.
65 Because of the real chance of the abuse of power, which stems from ownership and management of the network infrastructure, on the upstream or 
downstream markets.
66 There are several kinds of separation having different nature or intensity. The first grade of separation is accounting separation, which demands separate 
accounting for each activity. The second grade of separation is functional separation, which demands separate business units or departments (within the same 
legal person) for each activity. The third grade of separation is legal separation, which demands separate legal persons for each activity. Finally, the fourth grade 
of separation is ownership separation, which demands separate ownership for each activity, that is to say, there cannot be a business group carrying out the 
operation of network infrastructure (essential facility) and which would at the same time carrying out one or more activities at the upstream or downstream 
market(s).
67  Where the network infrastructure is predominantly operated by public undertakings, e.g.:
- ELES, d.o.o., electricity transmission system operator, 
- SODO, d.o.o., electricity distribution system operator, 
- Plinovodi, d.o.o., natural gas transmission system operator, 
- Pošta Slovenije, d.o.o., universal postal services operator, 
-Telekom Slovenije, d.d., communications system operator, 
- Slovenske železnice – Infrastruktura, d.o.o., rail system operator.  
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competition within the market68.  
However, that is certainly not to say, the competition 
sprang up in the aforementioned sectors only. After all, 
in the new paradigm of social market economy as intro-
duced at the beginning of the nineties a private property 
protection, free business incentive and market competi-
tion became a general rule69. Yet, also this rule is not wit-
hout exceptions or limits, mainly due to the public interest 
considerations70. In the social market economy, economic 
aims shall not a priori prevail over non-economic aims71. 
This approach is important to take into consideration in 
all economic sectors, particularly in those providing essen-
tial services. I would also like to point out the water sec-
tor, not only because it is a typical network infrastructure 
sector but also because of the new constitutional provi-
sion which explicitly recognized the self-standing right to 
drinking water and it reserved provision of the household 
water supply for public sector72. 
The Slovenian water sector was not  liberalized according 
to the aforementioned liberalization pattern, yet some 
market competition, although modest, sprang up, but 
private participation is relatively weak73. In principle, the 
Slovenian water sector is dominated by vertically integra-
dossier
ted public bodies, predominantly by local and regional 
public undertakings74. Even though I do not want to make 
any prejudice, since at the moment there is still no act for 
implementation of the new article 70a of the Constitution 
and, logically, no case law in this regard, it is relatively safe 
to say that at least in the mid- and long-term period75 the 
new constitutional provision has a potential to affect the 
water sector structure and competition76. As far as I un-
derstand the new constitutional provision, it excludes pri-
vate participation in two ways; it demands public owner-
ship over water resources as well as public provision of 
water supply services. With other words, the Constitution 
itself now prohibits two kinds of the genuine or material 
privatization, i.e. privatization of public asset (water re-
sources) and of public task (provision of water supply ser-
vice)77. Yet, this seems to be in line with the EU law since 
it is neutral in relation to national decisions governing the 
ownership regime for water undertakings78, and also – at 
least de iure79 – in relation to the self-provision of public 
tasks in the water sector80. On the other hand, however, I 
have scruples about the (supposed)81 intent to transform 
the household water supply from economic to non-eco-
nomic activity82.  
Let me here also point out that the new constitutional pro-
vision is directed at water resources and household water 
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68  A market competition is not protected by the European Union rules only, but also by the genuine domestic rules, including competition rules, whose scope 
of application is not limited to cases where the trade between Member States may be affected.
69 At the moment, I am not aware of any specific liberalization agenda, since the competition approach is already dominant. But at the same time, I would like to point 
out that there is a privatization agenda according to which more or less all public utilities companies directly or indirectly owned by the Republic of Slovenia are classified 
as strategic investment which should in principle stay in the state’s hands (see http://www.sdh.si/en-us). For practical reasons, let me point out the article 345 TFEU 
according to which the Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership.
70 In principle, supranational (and national) competition rules define relative prohibition of restrictions of competition. See for example articles 101(3), 106(2) and 
107(2-3) TFEU.
71 In case of their collision, a careful primacy-assessment must be carried out on case-by-case basis.
72  Article 70a of the Constitution: 
(1) Everyone has the right to drinking water. (2) Water resources shall be a public good managed by the state. (3) As a priority and in a sustainable manner, water 
resources shall be used to supply the population with drinking water and water for household use and in this respect shall not be a market commodity. (4)The 
supply of the population with drinking water and water for household use shall be ensured by the state directly through self-governing local communities and on a 
not-for-profit basis.
73 Here, I limit myself to household water supply services and to waste water or sewage services.
74 In 2014, the structure of the Slovenian Water Sector was as follows: self-provision: 26%; local public undertakings: 26 %; regional public undertakings: 58%; (private) 
concessions: 4%.
75 I expect that the existing concessions granted to private undertakings will remain in force.
76 At any rate in the field of household water supply services while this is less likely in case of waste water or sewage services.
77 Privatization in a wide sense is a transfer of something, e.g. of a task, right or asset, from a public to private sphere. In theory, there are different classifications of 
privatization, however, in this article I use very common classification, i.e., the so-called formal privatization in case a legal person of public law is converted into legal 
person of private law, and the so-called genuine or material privatization in case a specific (public) task is transferred to private person where the transferred task remains 
under the public control, e.g. public services concession, or where this is not the case; or in case a specific (public) asset is transferred to private person (e.g. sale of shares).
78 See article 345 TFEU.
79 In addition, one should also consider possibility of de facto impact of state aid and other general competition rules.
80  See Communication from the Commission on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Water and sanitation are human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!’, 
COM(2014) 177 final, 19. 3. 2014.
81  This assumption relies on the informal discussion with a member of a working group which has prepared the theoretical background for the new constitutional 
provision.
82  The application of the competition rules does not depend on whether the entity is set up to generate profits. Non-profit entities can also offer goods and services on 
a market. See Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 262, 19. 
7. 2016, p. 1.
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supply ‘only’, therefore it at least formally (de iure) allows 
private participation and market competition in other seg-
ments of the water sector, e.g. the disposal of sewage or 
waste water. In the daily practice, however, although the 
core activities such as water supply and wastewater treat-
ment are legally considered as two different activities, in 
most cases the same undertaking provides both activities 
in a given geographical area. 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Network 
Infrastructure Sectors
PPPs can be found in all aforementioned network infras-
tructure sectors, yet, until now, projects above 1million 
EUR are mainly concentrated in the field of energy83 and 
water84, which are mainly concentrated at the sub-national 
level (i.e. regional or local/municipality level). I assume 
that in these two fields even new public private partner-
ships will be established in the near future considering the 
trend towards smart grids in the field of energy and also 
considering the need to modernize as well as to expand the 
canalization and sewage or sanitation plants85. Moreover, 
I assume at least some new PPPs in Slovenia will be es-
tablished in the field of (tele)communications; namely, 
because of thoughtless spatial planning which led to very 
dispersed settling with low user-density, there are a lots 
of (rural) areas where private investors alone will certainly 
not be willing to invest in the so-called high- and ultra-
speed broadband networks. Moreover, at the moment it is 
also not certain how the so-called second rail track will be 
built, while PPP is one of several options. 
The Republic of Slovenia enacted its Public-Private 
Partnership Act as late as 200686. The act regulates the 
purpose and principles of private investment in public 
projects and/or of public co-financing of private projects 
that are in the public interest (hereinafter: PPP)87, the 
methods of encouraging PPP and the institutions concer-
ned with its encouragement and development, the condi-
tions, procedure for creation and the forms and methods 
dossier
of operating PPPs, the special features of works and ser-
vice concessions and of public-private equity partnerships, 
the transformation of public companies, the system of 
law that applies to resolving disputes arising from PPPs 
and the jurisdiction of the courts and arbitration services 
to decide on disputes arising from such relationships88. 
Unfortunately, considering the length of this article, only 
certain issues can be discussed here.
The purpose of the Act is twofold. It intends to foster and 
protect the public interest and it intends to enable and 
promote private investment in the construction, main-
tenance and/or operation of structures and facilities of 
PPP and other projects that are in the public interest, to 
ensure the economically sound and efficient performance 
of commercial and other public services or other activities, 
which are provided in a method and under conditions that 
apply to commercial public services. It also relates to other 
activities whose performance is in the public interest, aims 
to facilitate the rational use, operation or exploitation of 
natural assets, constructed public good or other things in 
public ownership, and other investment of private or pri-
vate and public funds in the construction of structures and 
facilities that are partly or entirely in the public interest, or 
in an activity provided in the public interest89.  
The Act defines methods of promoting PPPs. In order to 
promote PPP, the public partner must, inter alia, assess 
whether it can be carried out as a PPP; namely, it shall 
assess the grounds of project feasibility and comparison 
of options or other projects. This assessment is obligatory, 
except in the case of projects provided by a regulation. In 
my opinion, in this regard some improvements are still 
possible. There are cases where in reality no business risk 
was transferred to private persons who even do not make 
any investments and yet exclusive or special rights were 
granted90. Again, at the state level more should be done 
not in terms of support only, even in form of consulta-
tions, but also in terms of control. Another tool to pro-
mote ‘healthy’ projects is that decisions determining the 
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83 More precisely, natural gas distribution network.
84 More precisely, water distribution network, canalization and sewage or sanitation plants.
85 Here is already considered a potential impact of the new constitutional provision, which would probably decrease public private partnerships regarding the 
water distribution network. The latter will, however, need great investments considering the fact that one-fourth of the Slovenian water network was installed 
before the year 1920. See Water and Wastewater Services in the Danube Region: Slovenia Country Note, IMF, 2015, p. 6.
86 As it seems the act will be modified in the near future by the Act on the award of concession contracts and public-private partnerships which intends to 
implement the Directive 2014/23/EU of the European parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28. 
3. 2014, p. 1. In addition to the aforementioned ‘central’ act in the field of public private partnerships, also some other horizontal and sector specific acts apply.
87 More precisely, according to the article 2 of the Public-Private Partnership Act, public-private partnership is a relationship involving private investment 
in public projects and/or public co-financing of private projects that are in the public interest, and such relationship is formed between public and private 
partners in connection with the construction, maintenance and operation of public infrastructure or other projects that are in the public interest, and in 
connection with the associated provision of commercial and other public services or activities provided in a way and under the conditions applicable to com-
mercial public services, or of other activities where their provision is in the public interest, or other investment of private or private and public funds in the 
construction of structures and facilities that are in part or entirely in the public interest, or in activities where their provision is in the public interest.
88 See article 1 of the Public-Private Partnership Act.
89 See articles 6 and 7 of the Public-Private Partnership Act.
90 See Poročilo o sklenjenih oblikah javno-zasebnega partnerstva v Republiki Sloveniji (2009).
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public interest in establishing PPP and on implementing 
projects in one of the forms of PPP shall be taken by the 
Government or by the representative body of a self-go-
verning local community. Other public partners may take 
decisions determining the public interest in establishing 
PPP and on implementing projects in one of the forms 
of PPP only on the basis of the agreement of the founder 
or of authorization provided by law. PPP contracts shall 
be adopted by other public partners after obtaining the 
consent of the founder91. Yet, also in this regard I some-
time miss more awareness that PPP is not a miracle so-
lution which always works, no matter how it is planned 
and executed. The truth is, PPP is neutral since it could 
be either success or failure, depending on its performance 
from the first to last day of the project. Although for now 
I am not aware of any project in the Republic of Slovenia 
that would fail, I would like explicitly to point out that we 
shall not assess the sphere of private and public92 partners 
only, but also the sphere of customers/users. 
The Act empowers the Ministry of finances to form a spe-
cial organizational unit within its structure to develop, mo-
nitor and cooperate in implementing PPPs in Slovenia, to 
draw up manuals for operating PPPs, to formulate expert 
proposals for amendments to regulations and the adoption 
of other measures that might help improve practices and 
eliminate problems in this area, and to perform other tasks 
provided by this Act. In addition, for the purpose of stu-
dying policy and providing consultation in the area of PPP 
a Council of the Slovenian Government for PPP shall be 
created, which shall be headed by the minister competent 
for finance, while other members of the Council shall be 
independent experts in the economic, legal and other areas 
of PPP93. Yet, in my opinion, this institutional support 
needs to be reconsidered and reformed in order to become 
more proactive. What is more, I believe that the major 
shortcoming in the discussed field is weak national-level or 
central support and capacity to plan nation-wide projects. 
Nevertheless, as the practice shows, PPPs at the local level 
are in principle very successful in terms of planning and 
executing projects, even when relatively large-scale.
Last but certainly not least, the Slovenian Public-Private 
Partnership Act recognizes two forms of PPP94. Namely, 
the contractual and institutional (equity) PPPs. In the 
network infrastructure sectors the latter can be found 
very rarely. That is to say, a great majority of all PPPs in 
the Republic of Slovenia are established in the form of 
contractual arrangement.  
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Conclusion
Legal framework for liberalization and regulation of public 
utilities in the Republic of Slovenia (particularly in the 
economic sectors such as energy, communications, postal 
services and transport) is in principle comparable to this 
kind of legal frameworks in other EU Member States. 
Namely, in the new paradigm of social market economy 
as introduced at the beginning of the nineties a private 
property protection, free business incentive and market 
competition became a general rule. Yet, this is not to say 
there are no exceptions, which are probably most obvious 
in the water sector. Nevertheless, a private participation 
and market competition are in principle more or less pres-
ent in all network infrastructure sectors, but of course not 
of the same intensity and not of the same kind. As I alrea-
dy said, in the central or pure public utilities markets, i.e. 
network infrastructure operation markets, one can mainly 
find competition for the market, while in the upstream 
and downstream markets dominates competition within 
the market95.  
In the field of PPPs one can notice relatively well deve-
loped legal framework, however, institutional support at 
the level of state needs to be improved and more pro-active 
approach of the Government would be highly welcome. 
In fact, the biggest weakness lies in the institutional design 
and capacity to plan nation-wide projects. This is in parti-
cular obvious when state projects are compared with local 
projects. Namely, local projects have been relatively large 
in investment terms, and it is fair to say that numerous 
local authorities have shown capacity to plan and execute 
large-scale projects which is certainly encouraging. 
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Introduction
Since democratic changes in 2000, after a long and still 
ongoing process of transition to a market economy, the 
Serbian government strives to pursue fiscal, structural 
and regulatory reforms under an IMF program that runs 
through 2018. GDP Annual Growth Rate in Serbia ave-
raged 2.81 percent from 1997 until 2016. 
The Serbian road to the European Union (EU) started 
in November 2000, when a ”Framework Agreement 
between the EU and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY)” was signed, enabling the EU to provide assistance 
for political and economic reforms. The Stabilization and 
Association Agreement between the EU and Serbia was 
signed on April 200896. On 22 December 2009, Serbia 
applied for EU membership and received candidate status 
for EU membership in March 2012. The Council of the 
European Union decided on 28 June 2013 to open acces-
sion negotiations with Serbia97. As a candidate country, 
Serbia has to align its system of macro-economic gover-
nance with the requirements set out by the EU. Namely, 
the Enlargement Strategy of the European Commission 
suggested for the first time to create European Semester 
Light, fostering the system of national economic plan-
ning in order to assist western Balkan states with tackling 
economic reforms, restructuring their economies and sti-
mulating growth and employment from the early stages 
of accession negotiations.
For more than a decade in Serbia, the reforms were 
guided by neo-liberal doctrine and fostered by conditio-
nality imposed primarily through international financial 
institutions such as the IMF. Privatization, liberalization 
and deregulation were the main pillars of the reforms, 
blindly followed by politicians who have made many 
wrong decisions in setting transition goals. After more 
than two decades of transition, a political interest still 
dominates in assets, and the inefficiencies of the public 
sector of the economy have accumulated a large structural 
deficit, passed through to public debt. Drafted on the basis 
of the Guideline on National Reform Programs issued by 
the European Commission, Serbia’s Economic Reform 
Program of 2016 focuses on steps ensuring the completion 
of the privatization and restructuring of public companies 
and reduction of the state’s share in the economy.  
Even though tremendous progress has been achieved in 
liberalization, privatization, and macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, the Serbian economy still faces problems generated 
by the public sector, including country wide network in-
dustries or local utilities. Although assets for performance 
of local services of general economic interest were mostly 
left in the ownership of local authorities, the modalities 
of private infrastructure financing may be expected in the 
future, and hence all the inherited risks. 
On the way to liberalization and restructuring local 
utilities providers
Restructuring of public enterprises and communal services 
providers (as a special legal form for provision of services 
of general economic interest) is one of the most important 
reforms on the agenda, and a big challenge for state and 
local administrations. Restructuring of public enterprises 
and liberalization in the network infrastructure sector to 
comply with the EU rules on competition is, on the other 
hand, an explicit duty assumed by signing the Stabilization 
Liberalization Agenda and the General Framework of 
Serbian Local Public Utility Services Regulatory Regime
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and Association Agreement. 
From a strategic standpoint, the reform of public utilities 
in Serbia has been an issue on the agenda since the early 
2000s. One of the most comprehensive strategic docu-
ments has been created within an EU funded project – 
Municipal Infrastructure Support Program, the beneficiary 
of which was the Ministry of Regional Development and 
Local Self-Government in 2010. Within this project, seve-
ral toolkits were created dealing with project preparation, 
implementation, feasibility study etc. A (draft) Strategy 
of Restructuring of Public Utility Services has also been 
one of the outputs of this project98. However, up to now 
no systemic steps were taken to operationalize the idea 
of restructuring public utilities. The Fiscal Strategy fore-
saw the enactment of the Program of restructuring local 
public utilities, and drafting of the National Strategy for 
Restructuring Local Public Utilities. However, no official 
document has yet been published. Recently amended Law 
on Communal Activities has paved a way for the entry of 
private capital, but without any strategic approach there is 
a risk that the practice may diverge in more than 150 local 
self-government (local territorial government) units.
The legal framework
The main components of an enabling legal framework
As a pre-condition for liberalization of communal services, 
the most important legal framework set out by general 
legislation should refer to the issues of ownership rights, 
organizational forms of service delivery, the public pro-
curement framework and tendering procedures, service 
financing mechanisms, price-setting mechanisms, the 
budgetary framework of funding capital investments, and 
ensuring quality control and consumer protection. Péteri 
classified the most important preconditions for local uti-
lity service delivery into seven categories (Péteri 2003: 
11–22). First among them is legislation on organizational 
forms of service delivery, which ranges from rules on mu-
nicipal enterprises to general company laws. Depending 
on the scope of decentralization, local governments are 
responsible for strategic development of public utility 
services as well as for various capital investment schemes 
for local projects. In addition to the legal framework on 
tendering and public procurement procedures (PPP), PPP 
rules refer to privatization and restructuring by creating 
the framework for alternative service provision, which 
should enable better resource allocation and better perfor-
mance, i.e., key components in service delivery, the selec-
tion process of private partners, specifications of perfor-
mance, agreements on price setting, service monitoring, 
dossier
and renegotiations. One of the critical components of the 
regulatory process is the price-setting mechanism, if prices 
are approved by a central level entity or the municipality 
who “owns” public utility. 
Organizational forms, control and ownership
The Law on Public Enterprises and Activities of General 
Economic Interest99 defines activities of general economic 
interest, which include public utilitie100s. Article 3 of this 
law defines a public undertaking in a formalistic approach, 
as a specific type of a legal entity, a company established by 
the state, autonomous province or a local self-government 
unit. In addition, services of general economic interest 
could be provided by a limited liability or a joint stock 
company exclusively owned by the State, company owned 
by the Republic of Serbia, autonomous province, local 
self-government unit or a subsidiary of such companies, 
as well as the company or an entrepreneur to whom the 
public body has conferred the provision of services. This 
definition is not in line with the Commission Directive 
2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency 
of financial relations between Member States and public 
undertakings as well as on financial transparency within 
certain undertakings101. Also, it contradicts the definition 
prescribed in the Law on Public Private Partnership and 
Concession, which is in line with the above directive. 
The Law on Public Enterprises and Activities of General 
Economic Interest regulates the setting up and the busi-
ness of public enterprises. It entails general conditions for 
performance of activities/delivery of services, or corporate 
governance. 
The law on Public Utility Activities102 listed fifteen com-
munal services, among which the majority represent ser-
vices of general economic interest (e.g. water provision, 
district heating, parking service) which specific regulatory 
regime is more precisely defined in the Law on Consumer 
Protection103, however only in terms of consumer rights 
such as the right to access, protection against disconnec-
tion, redress etc. An option is left to cities and municipa-
lities to define, in their decisions on public utilities (based 
on this law) other potential communal services, as well as 
details on the performance of services. Only the activities 
of water distribution and the city transport by trolleybus 
and tramway may not be provided by a private party, but 
solely a public enterprise owned by the local self-govern-
ment unit.  
Competences and regulatory powers of Local Self-
Government Units
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99 Official Gazette, No. 15/2016.
100 This corresponds to services of general economic interest in the sense of article 106(2) of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union.
101 OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17–25.
102 Official Gazette, Nos. 88/2011, 104/2016.
103 Articles 83-92, Official Gazette, Nos. 62/2014, 6/2016.
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The Act on Territorial Organization of the Republic of 
Serbia104 regulates its territorial organization, formed of 
the following units: autonomous provinces (Vojvodina 
and Kosovo), 24 cities and 150 municipalities. There are 
29 administrative districts, but an administrative district 
does not represent a territorial organization unit, but ra-
ther a regional center of state authority. Law on Local-Self 
Government regulates105, among other issues, competences 
and authorities of the City of Belgrade, and cities and 
municipalities as local self-government units. According 
to this Law, the city or municipality may establish public 
enterprises, or the public service could be contracted out, 
in line with the principle of competition, transparency 
and the application of the Law on Public Procurement. 
Namely, the Assembly of the city or municipality decides 
on setting up the services and public enterprises, executive 
and oversight boards, and gives consent on the statutes of 
such entities. In line with article 20 of this Law, the unit 
of a local self-government ensures the provision and deve-
lopment of communal services, and the organizational, 
material and other conditions for the performance of such 
services.
One of the consequences of the outdated definition of 
a public enterprise is that different rules apply to public 
companies, companies in majority state ownership and 
private companies performing activities of general interest. 
The Law on Activities of General Interest has not prescri-
bed the details of the procedure for conferral of the activi-
ties of general interest. Local utilities are within municipal 
competence. The agreement on conferral, as an alternative 
to concession, is supposed to regulate mutual rights and 
obligations. 
Article 69 of the Law on Public Enterprises and Activities 
of General Economic Interest, representing lex generalis in 
the matter of public sector enterprises, provides a means 
of “securing the protection of general interest” authorizing 
the Government, the competent body of the province or a 
city/municipality to give consent to the statute, guarantees 
and sureties, tariffs (safe when other law prescribed that 
another body grants consent), terms of supply of goods 
and services, disposal of assets in state ownership, capital 
investment, etc.
The Law on Utility Services106 further explains the compe-
tence for managing local utilities. Pursuant to the Article, 
the local self-government unit determines, in line with this 
law, the conditions for performing communal services, 
dossier
rights and responsibilities of utility service users, the extent 
and quality of communal services, and the conduct of su-
pervision of the performance of services. The Government 
determines the main features such as the minimal geo-
graphical cover or number of citizens to which a services 
is provided, a frequency of delivery, quality parameters, 
technical capacity which providers should fulfill etc. This 
Law further specifies the legislative power of the local self-
government unit to determine the manner of performance 
of services, general and special rights of service providers, 
including price controls and supervisory powers. This Law 
(Articles 25–29) sets the principles for price setting, basic 
parameters of price methodology, the procedure of the 
change in prices of communal services and supervisory 
power of the city/municipality in this regard107, as well as 
the subsidized price for certain categories of users.
Contracting-out the supply of utility services and 
procurement
At the local level, infrastructure investments by private 
investors were initially executed on the basis of the Law 
on Utility Activities of 1997, which enabled conferral of 
performing of communal services to an entity not owned/
operated by the city/municipality. Most investments were 
made in the sector of hygiene and waste management, 
areas which do not assume a large infrastructure invest-
ment. Even before the first legal act regulating public-pri-
vate partnerships was adopted, some forms of institutional 
PPPs were concluded forming a partnership between a 
municipality or a group of municipalities and a private 
partner. (Grubišić et al, 2015). 
The existing Law on Public Utility Activities (Article 9) 
is the basis for conferral of performance of services, on 
the basis of decision of the Assembly (city/municipal). The 
procedure of conferral of services is subject to the applica-
tion of rules on public procurement and the general PPP 
and concessions framework. Law on public-private par-
tnership and concessions calls for the application of the 
provisions of the Law on public procurement108. In this 
way these provisions indirectly form the constituent part 
of the Law on public-private partnership. Amendments 
to the Law on PPP and concessions specify that service 
concessions are classified as the group of contracts awarded 
based on the Law on Public Procurement. 
Brief overview of the PPPs and concessions normative 
framework 
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104 Official Gazette, Nos.129/2007 i 18/2016.
105 Official Gazette, Nos. 129/2007, 83/2014, 101/2016.
106 Official Gazette, Nos. 88/2011, 104/2016.
107 As prescribed in Article 28, the competent body of a local self-government unit gives consent to the proposal for price change. The proposal com-
prises the explanation of the rationales for price change and the detailed structure of the proposed price. The proposal has to be published at least 15 
days before the competent body decides on price change. Alternatively, the Assembly of the city or municipality may determine the conditions for price 
change even before the consent of a competent body, if this is stipulated in the agreement on conferral of provision of services.
108 Official Gazette, Nos. 124/2012, 14/2015, 68/2015.
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The Law on Public Private Partnerships and Concessions 
of 2011 was, obviously, drafted under the influence of po-
tential investors, and its rules enable a flexible approach to 
project financing. It may be claimed that the new regula-
tory framework is satisfactory to a larger extent (Radulovic 
and Nenezic, 2012). This Law contains necessary rules (for 
example on surety instruments, step-in rights, etc.) recom-
mended by relevant international practice guides such is 
the European PPP Expertise Center (EPEC) guide on 
PPP of the European Investment Bank109, Public-Private 
Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Center of the World 
Bank, etc. The Law regulates the conditions and methods 
for defining, proposing and approving the partnerships, 
defines the subjects authorized to propose and execute the 
projects of public-private partnerships, the rights and du-
ties of the public and private sector partners, the form and 
the content of the public contract (with or without the 
concession elements), the legal protection in the proce-
dure of awarding the public contract, the subject matter of 
concession, as well as all other issues which are significant 
for the realization of a public-private partnership.
Public-private partnership is achieved in two ways and is 
organized in two legal forms: contractual and institutional. 
Concessions form a special part of public-private partner-
ship. Article 20 stipulates that the public agreement shall 
be concluded as a public-private partnership agreement or 
as a concession agreement. Duration of the public-private 
partnership project, i.e. concession, is limited to a maxi-
mum of 50 years.
In July 2013, on the basis of the Law on PPP and 
Concessions, the Commission for Public Private 
Partnership adopted a Methodology for the Value for 
Money analysis in Public-Private Partnerships and 
Concessions110. This analysis should be obligatory when 
the PPP does not have elements of a concession, but the 
same methodology should be used in a feasibility study 
for a PPP with the elements of concession, prepared by a 
public body.
In order to enhance the transparency of the granting pro-
cess and evidence of the public contracts, in June 2013 
a Rulebook for the recordkeeping and content of public 
contracts register was adopted111. However, the general 
public opinion in Serbia is that the process of public ten-
dering and public contracts is not sufficiently transparent. 
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Amendments to the Law on public-private partnership 
and concessions, effective March 2016, have been intro-
duced to secure a better control of fiscal risks in PPP pro-
jects through the analysis of fiscal impact for project pro-
posals exceeding 50 million EUR112. 
The effect of financial limits imposed on local 
authorities
In terms of sources of financing, Serbian cities and muni-
cipalities may be divided into two groups (Nenezic and 
Radulovic, 2012:66). The first group comprises local self-
government units which have reached the upper limits set 
out in the Law on Public Debt113. The other group is com-
posed of those entities with low credit capacity and status, 
and to whom banks are not interested to lend, but could 
be interesting to international financial institutions and 
development banks. Limiting factors for financing are also 
related to low cash flows mainly due to limited govern-
ment support, tariff policy. Therefore public utility com-
panies are more prone to short term financing. Further, 
the Law on Public Property imposes restrictions related to 
surety. Namely, when assets are not treated as assets of an 
enterprise, the public company is treated as the user of the 
publicly owned assets (ownership by the state)114. Another 
limit is related to the lack of possibility of issuing a gua-
rantee by local self-governance units, due to the Law on 
Public Debt. The last limitation could, to a certain extent, 
be mitigated through the support agreement. When credit 
support or financing from own resources is not a viable 
option for a communal service provider, the PPP is an 
option both for the local self-government unit, and the 
service provider owned by the municipality.
Project proposals which have been awarded a positive 
opinion (green light) by the Commission for PPPs
Since March 2012, as of the date 21 February 2017, the 
Commission has evaluated around fifty proposals for PPPs 
with or without elements of concession and has issued 44 
positive opinions for PPPs with or without elements of 
concession115. The following table (Table 1) shows that the 
majority of positive opinions related to communal services, 
while only five were related to other infrastructure projects 
such as railroad concession, river port etc. Unfortunately, 
there is no official data about the exact amount of projec-
ted and/or performed PPPs and concessions in Serbia. 
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109 The European PPP Expertise Centre, The EPEC PPP Guide available at: http://www.eib.org/epec/g2g/
110 Available at: http://www.ppp.gov.rs/dok/38/Metodologija%20za%20analizu%20dobijene%20vrednosti%20u%20odnosu%20na%20
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111 Official Gazette, No. 57/2013.
112 Local projects and the other small-scale projects still remain to be developed in a decentralized manner. However, the opinion of the Ministry shall 
be necessary only for PPP and Concession projects where the contracting authorities / public bodies proposing the project are under the governmental 
authority and if their value exceeds 50 million EUR.
113 Article 36, Law on Public Debt, Official Gazette Nos. 61/2005, 107/2009, 78/2011 and 68/2015.
114 Articles 19-20, Law on Public Property, Official Gazette Nos. 72/2011, 88/2013, 105/2014, 104/2016 – other law and 108/2016.
115  The full list of projects granted positive opinion is available at: http://www.ppp.gov.rs/dok/37/MISLJENJA%20KOMISIJE.pdf
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Table (1) Proposals which have been granted a green light by the Com-
mission for PPPs116
Communal Services City/Municipality
District Heating Zrenjanin, Niš, Batočina, Vrbas, Pirot
Waste Management Topola, Žagubica, Regional Center Keleš, 
Grocka117,  Belgrade,
Public Sewage System 
Reconstruction
Stara Pazova
Public Transport (City or 
Municipal)
Loznica, Topola, Srbobran, Nis, Jagodina, 
Šabac, Negotin, Paraćin, Belgrade118, 
Belgrade119,  Kanjiža, Ruma
Public Lighting Topola, Sečanj, Vrbas, Vranje, Varvarin, 
Žabalj, Ada, Beočin, Plandište, Bor, Petro-
vac na Mlavi, Kruševac
Maintenance of residential 
buildings and institutions, 
public lighting and chim-
ney-sweeping120  
Novi Sad
Water distribution system 
and construction of a small 
power plant
Brus
Local railroad construction 
and maintenance
Stara Pazova
Public Parking Garage Sabac
Other City/Municipality
River port and Road 
Terminal
Apatin
Railroad Concession E-763 Belgrade-Pozega
Building, reconstruction 
and maintenance of 
Belgrade Airport and the 
airport operation
Belgrade






Due to the lack of planning and appropriate risk manage-
ment, some of the approved projects related to commu-
nal infrastructure failed in realization, such is the District 
Heating PPP in the City of Zrenjanin, which was entered 
into without a proper feasibility study. Some important 
infrastructure projects are in the pipeline, such as the offer 
for the selection of an operator for the Vinca waste landfill 
as part of a public-private partnership, currently one of the 
biggest projects of its kind in Europe. Due to the project’s 
complexity, in line with the Law on Public Procurement, 
the competitive bidding process had been launched and 
pre-qualification process for the assessment of qualified 
bidders is under way. According to the City Council of 
Belgrade, eleven investors expressed their interest. The 
project involves construction, operation and maintenance 
of a municipal waste treatment facility and foresees the 
dossier
construction of a mechanical biological treatment plant 
with refuse-derived fuel production121. 
The need to strengthen the institutional capacity for 
private infrastructure initiatives
As of the 1990s, the trend of decentralization and privati-
zation of local communal services in Central and Eastern 
Europe has been continuous, with legislation enabling 
contracting for service delivery just one among a num-
ber of determinants of successful project implementation. 
However, a stable regulatory framework, institutional 
capacity, transparency, and the competence and accoun-
tability of public administration, including at the local 
level, are indispensable features in the agenda of priorities 
for development policies and the transformation process 
in post-communist economies (Laffont, 2005; Hodgson, 
1998). Experiences in development aid show that streng-
thening administrative capacities and institution building 
is the key determinant in transition economies (Graham, 
2002). Among different levels of influence and the deve-
lopment of PPP policies and projects, institutional sup-
port represents one of the main preconditions of an effec-
tive PPP policy (Verhoest et al., 2014). One of the main 
problems in developing PPP projects in Serbia is the lack 
of administrative capacity of local self-government units 
even in the phase of formulating the potential projects.
Although a new Serbian Law on Investments122 has esta-
blished a modern Serbian Development Agency, regional 
development agencies are not sufficiently involved in the 
development of instruments of financing local economic 
development and private infrastructure financing. The 
problem of „missing middle“ (Shaw and Greenhalgh, 
2010) could be solved by a more active role of the asso-
ciation of cities and municipalities (Standing Conference 
of Cities and Municipalities), and the strengthening of 
the network of cooperation among Serbian regional de-
velopment agencies. Law on Investment mandated the 
creation of local economic development and investment 
support units within the local self-government units, 
an entity authorised by the local self-governments, or a 
dedicated project team to provide support to an investor 
investing in the development of communal and local „eco-
nomic infrastructure“. The role of the Serbian Chamber 
of Commerce, through its Office for Investment Support 
and Public-Private Partnership is worth mentioning, as 
well as the efforts made by the National Alliance for Local 
Economic Development (NALED), which represents an 
association of companies, municipalities and civil society 
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117 Co-generation, district heating.
118 Intra-city.
119 Inter-city.
120 All services proposed within one project.
121 http://balkangreenenergynews.com/eleven-offers-for-belgrade-landfill-ppp/
122 Official Gazette, No. 89/2015.
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organisations.
The functionality of PPP support institutions depends on 
several criteria, among which the following are crucial: 
political support, the competence of employees and well 
developed coordination mechanisms (Verhoest, 2014). 
Central PPP units may perform PPP policy formulation, 
technical support, the promotion of PPP and capacity 
building, but may also green-light projects. Pursuant to 
article 65 of the Law on Public Private Partnerships and 
Concessions, a Commission for Public Private Partnership 
is set up by the Government of the Republic of Serbia 
and is composed of nine representatives of relevant minis-
tries, the city of Belgrade and the Province of Vojvodina. 
The main role of the Commission is to give its opinion 
on the PPP proposal, or the proposal of the concession 
agreement, after taking into account the opinion of the 
Ministry of Finance. 
The normative framework for PPP implementation, 
which is wider than laws regulating PPP and concessions, 
should recognize the role of local administrations not only 
as stakeholders in but also facilitators of PPP implementa-
tion (Jovanic, Sredojevic, 2016). In this sense, legislation 
in the western Balkans should better define the responsi-
bilities of local administrations and necessary procedures. 
However, determinants of the local government capacities 
needed for successful PPP implementation are not only set 
out in laws and regulations, and a number of the types of 
expertise are required for PPP promotion and execution.
Conclusion
This paper aimed to provide a general overview of the nor-
mative framework of public utilities of a local character in 
Serbia, and to give some proposals on the reform, notably 
the need to strengthen the capacities of the Commission 
for PPPs and the institutions providing technical sup-
port, as private infrastructure investment represents one 
of the pillars of regional development especially where the 
State, cities and municipalities have reached upper debt 
limits. Although during the last few years the normative 
framework has been upgraded and is mostly in line with 
EU requirements, investors are still not confident, projects 
and risk assessments not sufficiently elaborated, and local 
authorities not sufficiently educated about benefits, risks 
and negotiating procedures. All this leads to the conclu-
sion that the presence of international financial organi-
zations will be crucial for a successful implementation of 
large infrastructure projects. Public utilities of a local cha-
racter, due to underinvestment during the previous two 
decades, are in urgent need of restructuring. The new legal 
framework is an impetus for liberalization, however, the 
regulatory powers of local self governments are underde-
veloped, especially in the domain of economic regulation. 
Risks in public-private partnership projects and conces-
sions may be transferred to users, and therefore proper 
mechanisms of consumer representation at the local level 
and consumer protection should be developed (Jovanic, 
2012). Preferably, a public agency overseeing the regu-
latory powers of local self-government units should be 
established.
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The Journal holds an annual conference at the European University Institute in June each year (registra-
tions are now open). Papers presented there are offered a fast-track review process.
Editor in chief: 
Prof Matthias Finger, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and European University Institute 
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 19, issue 2, 2017 (June) “Competition Policy in Energy 
Markets: The Experience of Emerging Economies” 
The regulatory reform in developing countries took a prominent role in the 1990s. Both external and inter-
nal factors pushed many countries to liberalize their energy markets and introduce independent regulatory 
agencies to oversee the regulatory reforms. In the beginning, competition policy remained in the back-
ground. However, as liberalizations and regulatory reforms matured, competition policy has begun to come 
to the front. The advances such as technology and result-based tariff models also brought issues of anti-
competitive behaviour in energy markets. 
While technological and economic advances shape the new market framework, the economic literature 
catches up with the evolution of energy markets. For example, the competition issues created by incentive 
regulation models still do not get the attention they deserve.
This call for papers aims at contributing to the literature to close the gap, searching for academic contribu-
tions able to explore the major issues surrounding concurrent application of competition and regulation. 
The following are some of the issues we hope to address:
• The tensions between competition policy and regulation in energy markets,
• The evolution of tariff models and their relation to competition,
• Major competition investigations in the industry in the EU and US,
• Differing approaches to competition policy in both civil law and common law traditions, 
• How advances in technologies affect the role of competition policy,
• The potential for deregulation in the energy markets.
Guest editor: Dr Fuat Oğuz
The guest editor of this special issue on “Competition Policy in Energy Markets: The Experience of Emer-
ging Economies” is Dr Fuat Oğuz (B.A.: Ankara University, M.A.: The American University, Ph.D.: George 
Mason University). Dr Oğuz works in the areas of competition and regulation. He published extensively on 
telecommunications and energy markets. Dr Oğuz has experience in the tariff models, regulatory policies, 
market analyses and regulatory impact analysis. Currently, he is a professor of economics at Yıldırım Beyazıt 
University. He teaches law and economics, economics of regulation and antitrust.
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